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I. INTRODUCTION
I long have been interested in the legal and social treatment of pregnant women
whose behavior is thought to damage fetal health, and I have thought about the issue
from a variety of vantage points. In previous articles I have written about the free
exercise of religion of pregnant women who refuse medical treatment;1 the right to
be free from physical restraint during pregnancy, including freedom from
unwarranted detention, confinement and incarceration;2 and reproductive rights,
namely rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and freedom from unduly burdensome
government regulation.3 In this essay my focus is a bit different. Here, I argue that
we can and should approach the issue of pregnant women whose behavior may harm
their fetuses, not from the vantage point of fetal harm, but rather from the vantage
point of pregnant women’s social location. That location often includes poverty,
violence, need, and despair. Placing blame and exacting retribution on an individual
woman, absent an understanding of the social context, makes the provision of justice
in these cases difficult if not impossible. Moreover, attempts to enhance fetal health
by assigning criminal liability in such cases are destined to fail in light of the
significant contribution that negative social and economic conditions have on fetal
health, and over which pregnant women have little or no control.4
1

April L. Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical
Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REV. 563 (2002).
2

April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant Women
for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147 (2007) [hereinafter Cherry,
The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration].
3

April L. Cherry, Roe’s Legacy: The Non-Consensual Medical Treatment of Pregnant
Women and Implications for Female Citizenship, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 723 (2004) [hereinafter
Cherry, Roe’s Legacy].
4 See, e.g., Jean Ruth Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Punitive Versus Public Health Oriented
Responses to Drug Use by Pregnant Women, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 217, 218
(2001); Seema Mohapatra, Unshackling Addiction: A Public Health Approach to Drug Use
During Pregnancy, 26 WISC. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 241 (2011); Linda C. Fentiman,
Rethinking Addiction: Drugs Deterrence, and the Neuroscience Revolution, 12 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 233 (2011); Jeanne Flavin & Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishing Pregnant Drug-using
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Instead of viewing maternal behaviors that are harmful or fatal to fetuses as
criminal, we should view them as a function of the myriad social and economic
deprivations suffered by some women.5 I believe that if we explore the problem from
this viewpoint, focusing not solely on the fetus or fetal harm, but rather on the life
and health of the pregnant woman, we might be willing to bring an end to punitive
measures and construct more intelligent, effective, and socially just policies that will
more positively affect both maternal and fetal health.
To this end, this essay is divided into four sections. In section I, I detail three
archetypal scenarios of the criminal prosecution of pregnant women for behaviors
resulting in harm to, or the death of, their fetuses: (1) cases concerning depression
and attempted suicide, illustrated by the prosecution of Bei Bei Shuai;6 (2) cases
involving drug and alcohol use and abuse, illustrated by the prosecution of Rennie
Gibbs;7 and (3) prosecutions relating to self-induced abortion, illustrated by the
prosecution of Kawana Ashley.8 These cases demonstrate typical legal responses to
fetal harm caused by pregnant women. They also demonstrate the social and
economic context in which that harm occurs.
In sections II and III, I explore two contemporary rhetorical devices, arguments
regarding fetal personhood and maternal deviance. Both of these discourses have
significantly influenced society’s expectations of how a pregnant woman ought to
behave and the appropriate social and legal responses to any “misbehavior.” With
regard to the rhetoric of fetal personhood, I discuss the values articulated by its
proponents through consideration of the underlying philosophical and religious
arguments. I also consider how these values have been codified into law via state and
federal feticide statutes. I then discuss the rhetoric of maternal deviance and address
the ways in which the social construction of women as mothers, the good mother/bad
mother dichotomy, and the use of “choice,” influence that rhetoric. In these sections
I also demonstrate how fetal personhood and maternal deviance rhetoric
marginalizes pregnant women by encouraging the view of pregnant women as fetal
containers, rather than as self-governing beings. The invisibility of pregnant women
as self-governing persons sanctions the treatment, as criminal, of behaviors that are
Women: Defying Law, Medicine, and Common Sense, 29 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 231 (2010);
Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by Giving Birth, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 381
(2008); Barry M. Lester, Lynne Andreozzi & Lindsey Appiah, Substance Use During
Pregnancy: Time for Policy to Catchup with Research, 1 HARM REDUCTION J. 5 (2004).
5

See Schroedel & Fiber, supra note 4, at 218.

6

Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

7

During the pendency of this essay, the State of Tennessee passed legislation
criminalizing illicit drug use during pregnancy. See TENN. CODE § 39-13-107 (2014).
Tennessee has also prosecuted the first person under this statute, Mallory Loyola. Ms. Loyola
was arrested and charged with assault two days after giving birth. Her newborn had allegedly
tested positive for methamphetamines. See Sydney Lupkin, Why Some Doctors Object to
Tennessee Law that Criminalizes Drug Use During Pregnancy: Experts Weigh In on Law that
Led to New Mom’s Arrest, ABC NEWS, July 14, 2014, available at http://abcnews.go.com/
Health/doctors-object-tennessee-law-criminalizes-drug-pregnancy/story?id=24557525; Nina
Martin, A Stillborn Child, A Charge of Murder and the Disputed Case Law on ‘Fetal Harm’,
PROPUBLICA, Mar. 8, 2014, http://www.propublica.org/article/stillborn-child-charge-ofmurder-and-disputed-case-law-on-fetal-harm.
8

State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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primarily self-harming, and in the end work to criminalize “bad” mothering.9 Both
the fetal rights rhetoric and the rhetoric of maternal deviance effectively work to
control women’s behavior by objectifying women and viewing their primary purpose
as ensuring the health of the child. Such a conception of women operates to the
detriment of women’s dignity. And as such, it operates to the detriment of social
justice.
Finally in section IV, I propose that both the law and society shift focus: Rather
than continuing to criminalize women’s behavior when they fall short of society’s
expectation that they privilege the life and health of their fetuses above all else, this
essay suggests that society’s interests in healthier women, babies, and communities
would be better served through a more serious consideration of social context.
Society should focus on the lives of pregnant women, not to chastise, destroy, or
incarcerate them; but instead to see pregnant women in a more holistic way, and to
understand the social and economic conditions that may lead to adverse behaviors.10
This shift in focus will show that most adverse prenatal behaviors are not exclusively
or primarily directed at the fetus.
Focusing on the social context also illuminates the fact that destructive behavior
is injurious to the pregnant women herself, in addition to her fetus. By articulating
the issue as one of self-harm, we may be able to develop policies that more
9

Dorothy Roberts has written extensively on the criminalization of the “bad” mother.
See, e.g., DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 8–21 (1998) [hereinafter ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY]
(detailing stereotypes of Black women as bad mothers, including as mothers who damage
their children during pregnancy); Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L.
REV. 95, 97–98 (1993) [hereinafter Roberts, Motherhood and Crime] (“The law compels and
legitimizes prevailing relationships of power. Criminal law not only defines and mandates
socially acceptable behavior, it also shapes the way we perceive ourselves and our
relationships to others. Legal rules reward conduct that fulfills a woman’s maternal role and
punish conduct that conflicts with mothering. Society’s construction of mother, its image of
what constitutes a good mother and what constitutes a bad mother, facilitates its continuing
control of women. Society considers women who fail to meet the ideal of motherhood deviant
or criminal. It stigmatizes unwed mothers, unfit mothers, and women who do not become
mothers for violating the dominant norm. Considering our society’s general neglect of
children, it is probable that laws which punish mothers’ conduct do so just as much to enforce
gender roles as to protect children.”). See also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1419, 1436 (1991) [hereinafter Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts] (“[T]he prosecution of
crack-addicted mothers diverts public attention from social ills such as poverty, racism, and a
misguided national health policy and implies instead that shamefully high Black infant death
rates are caused by the bad acts of individual mothers”).
10

See Amy J. Schultz, et al., Discrimination, Symptoms of Depression, and Self-Rated
Health Among African American Women in Detroit: Results from a Longitudinal Analysis, 96
RES. & PRAC. 1265, 1265–70 (2006) (everyday discrimination is associated with poor physical
and mental health); C. Anne Broussard, Alfred L. Joseph & Marco Thompson, Stressors and
Coping Strategies Used by Single Mothers Living in Poverty, 27 J. WOMEN & SOC. WORK 190,
190–204 (2012). (“[Societal stigma diminishes] educational access and employment
opportunities, which combine to limit socioeconomic mobility and access to good-quality
health care. Also, research has shown that stigmatized individuals perceive stigma differently
and use different coping mechanisms than do non-stigmatized individuals . . . [Stigma and]
shame [are] related to depression . . . lower levels of self-esteem, [and] the . . . perception of
the [lack] of social support, and . . . to a greater fear of rejection for requested support.”).
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effectively ensure that pregnant women are able to lead healthier lives, and as a
result, deliver healthier babies. As bioethist George Annas has said: “If the state
really wants to protect fetuses it should do so by improving the welfare of pregnant
women – not by oppressing them.”11 To this end, I suggest looking to public health
law as a way to shape potential mechanisms to serve pregnant women (and by
extension, their fetuses) in more just and compassionate ways.12
II. THREE ACCOUNTS OF SELF-HARMING BEHAVIOR AMONG PREGNANT WOMEN
Self-harming behavior is not unique to pregnant women. People across racial,
social, and economic boundaries engage in it. As a society, we understand selfharming behavior in markedly different ways: as a symptom of individual illness, as
a social problem or group pathology,13 or as no problem at all.14 How we
11 George J. Annas, At Law: Pregnant Women as Fetal Containers, 16 HASTINGS CTR.
RPT. 13, 14 (1986).
12

The specific type of justice referred to in this context is social justice. Implicit in this
argument is the notion that social justice is a state concern, and as such, the state has an
obligation to promote and foster it. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE
41–42 (1999) (Citizens should have control over both their material and physical
environments, including bodily health, bodily integrity, thought, imagination, and affiliation);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971) (justice is “the first virtue of social institutions”);
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 110–113 (1993) (“justice as fairness” as a political
concern). Health is widely viewed as a social justice concern. See, e.g., MADISON POWERS &
RUTH FADEN, SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH
POLICY 5 (2006) (“Social justice is concerned with human well-being”); LAWRENCE O.
GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 16 (2d ed. 2008) (hereinafter PUBLIC
HEALTH LAW) (social justice is a widely appreciated aspect of public health ethics). The
concept of health as a political right can be found in the United Nation’s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc A/810, (Dec. 10,
1948).
13

“Social pathology” refers to a problem or behavior that is caused by a conflict of values
rather than as a problem of individual behavior. See Edwin H. Sutherland, Social Pathology,
50 J. OF SOCIOLOGY 429, 431 (1945). By labeling any behavior as part of a social pathology,
we can blame not just the actor, but the community from which they come. Pathologizing the
behavior also permits us to “hide the effects of power and privilege,” and to “stifle recognition
of a need to address social problems through sociopolitical change.” Judith Goode, Pathology,
Social, INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOC. SCI. (2008), available at http://www.encyclopedia.
com/topic/Social_Pathology.aspx). See also Monica T. Williams, African Americans and
Pathological Stereotypes: Assumptions about Race Can Lead to Wrong Conclusions and
Prejudice, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.psychologytoday.com/
blog/colorblind/201112/african-americans-and-pathological-stereotypes (“Pathological
stereotypes are ideas about groups of people that exist to explain and justify inequalities”).
Thus, it is not surprising that the behavior of poor minorities are pathologized in mainstream
American culture.
14 For example, libertarians are likely to view solely self-harming behavior as a protected
liberty where no state or community solution is warranted. Cf. LIBERTARIAN PARTY
PLATFORM, http://www.lp.org/platform (As adopted in Convention, June 2014, Columbus,
Ohio) (“Government exists to protect the rights of every individual including life, liberty and
property. Criminal laws should be limited to violation of the rights of others through force or
fraud, or deliberate actions that place others involuntarily at significant risk of harm. We favor
the repeal of all laws creating "crimes" without victims, such as the use of drugs for medicinal
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characterize such behavior often depends in large part on the actor and whether the
behavior harms innocent third parties.15 The self-harming behavior of pregnant
women is pathologizied and punished because it is seen as being potentially harmful
to a third party, the fetus. Below, I discuss three accounts of self-harming behavior
as a way to “de-pathologize” the behavior by exposing the effects of inequality.
A. Depression and Attempted Suicide: The Story of Bei Bei Shuai
In December 2010, a woman in Indiana named Bei Bei Shuai attempted suicide
by eating rat poison while eight months pregnant.16 Her attempt failed because she
was rushed to the hospital by friends.17 Eight days after the suicide attempt, her fetus
was delivered by emergency caesarian section.18 The child died a few days later.19
Notwithstanding Shuai’s admitted suicide attempt, Shuai was arrested and charged
with murder and attempted feticide.20 If found guilty, Shuai would face a prison
sentence of up to sixty-five years for, in essence, attempting to commit suicide while
pregnant.21
Moving to dismiss the charges, Shuai argued that the state’s murder and feticide
statutes did not apply to pregnant women who harm their fetuses and that the
application of these laws would violate both state and federal constitutional
protections.22 The trial court denied her motion.23 The appellate court affirmed the
or recreational purposes, since only actions that infringe on the rights of others can properly
be termed crimes. Individuals retain the right to voluntarily assume risk of harm to
themselves.”).
15 For example, when poor black and brown peoples engage in self-harming behaviors
society often considers it pathological, but when young, middle and upper class whites engage
in similarly self-harming behaviors, society is more likely to view that behavior as symptom
of mental illness or as an individual social problem. See, e.g., Ishmael Reed, The Black
Pathology Biz, THE NATION (Feb. 12, 2002) available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/black-pathology-biz# (“Black pathology is big business.
Two-thirds of teenage mothers are white, two-thirds of welfare recipients are white and white
youth commit most of the crime in this country . . . . Yet in the popular imagination blacks are
blamed for all these activities”); see also Williams, supra note 13 (Although African
Americans are less likely to use alcohol or drugs than whites or Latinos, stereotypes of Black
pathology are used to rationalize the disproportionate targeting of Black people for drug
related crimes).
16

Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 624.

20 Id. at 623 (“Shuai was released from the Methodist Psychiatric Unit on February 4,
2011. . . . On March 14, the State charged Shuai with murder, a felony, and Class B felony
attempted feticide, and Shuai turned herself in on the same day.”).
21 Robin Marty & Jessica Mason Pieklo, Criminalized Pregnancies: When One Woman’s
Suicide Attempt Becomes Murder, RH REALITY CHECK (May 16, 2013, 11:44 AM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/05/06/criminalized-pregnancies-when-one-womanssuicide-attempt-becomes-murder.
22 Brief of Appellant, Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (No.
49G09-1103-MR-014478).
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trial court decision, holding that pregnant women were not immune from prosecution
by any common law doctrine, state, or federal law.24 After a legal battle lasting twoand-a-half years, Shuai was allowed to plead guilty to the misdemeanor of criminal
recklessness and was sentenced to 178 days in jail.25 Dissenting from the appellate
court decision refusing to find abuse of discretion in the denial of bail, Judge Patricia
Riley stated that “it was never the intention of the legislature that the feticide statute
should be used to criminalize prenatal conduct of pregnant women.”26 Moreover,
Judge Riley also expressed her concern that the court’s interpretation of the feticide
statute, in recognizing criminal liability for the pregnant women’s behavior, “might
lead to a slippery slope whereby the feticide statute could be construed as covering a
full range of a pregnant woman’s behavior.”27
What is most surprising about this case is that the context, specifically, mental
illness and despair, was apparently deemed unimportant, irrelevant, and erased from
view, even though depression and suicide attempts generally are treated medically,
as a disease or mental disorder and not subjected to criminal law sanction.28 Even
where a third party is injured or killed as a result of attempted suicide, our
understanding of mental health usually proscribes prosecution of the battery or
homicide; the person attempting suicide is usually deemed as not having the
requisite mental intent to commit the crime.29
23

Shuai v. State, 2012 Ind. LEXIS 408 (Ind. May 11, 2012).

24

Shuai, 966 N.E. 2d at 62829.

25

By this point Shuai had been imprisoned, without the possibility of bail, for more than
one year. She also spent more than a year on bail, but with severe limitations on her freedom
(including subjection to surveillance and supervision). See Dave Stafford, Shuai Case
Resolved: Thorny Legal Issues Remain, IND. LAWYER (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.the
indianalawyer.com/shuai-case-resolved-thorny-legal-issues-remain/PARAMS/article/32121.
26

Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 635-36 (Riley, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).

27

Id. at 636.

28

In the United States, many early statutes viewed attempted suicide as a crime, usually a
misdemeanor. Donald W. Grieshober, Suicide – Criminal Aspects, 1 VILL. L. REV. 316, 318
(1956). At common law, suicide and attempted suicide were criminalized, viewing suicide as
immoral, and as a criminal offense against God and the Crown. Nevertheless, laws prohibiting
suicide were rarely enforced or were considered “a crime or unlawful act, although not a
punishable offense . . . . [Though] none of the modern codifications treats attempted suicide as
a crime.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 853 (5th ed. 2010) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.5 cmt., n.10 (1980)). Instead, those who have attempted suicide or are believed to be
suicidal are generally subject to involuntary commitment to a medical facility for evaluation
and treatment. See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-540 (A), 36-501(6); FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1) ;
OHIO REV. CODE §§ 5122.15(C), 5122.01(B).
29 For example, of attempted suicide, the Model Penal Code states that “[i]ntrusion of the
criminal law into such tragedies is an abuse. There is a certain moral extravagance in
imposing criminal punishment on a person who has sought his own self-destruction . . . and
who more properly requires medical or psychiatric attention.” Model Penal Code §210.5, cmt.
(1980). LaFave notes that presently, criminalization of suicide and attempted suicide is limited
to situations where “one whose unsuccessful attempt kills or injures someone else – a would
be rescuer or innocent bystander” or when the suicide is the result of persuasion, assistance, or
force from another person – that person is subjected to criminal liability. LAFAVE, supra note
28, at 853–54; see also Grieshober, supra note 28, at 317, 321–22 (acknowledging the
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Depression, suicide, attempted suicide, and suicidal ideation are not uncommon
among pregnant women. In fact, some studies indicate that one in eight, or 12.5% of
pregnant women, report suffering from depression.30 Other studies put that number
higher, estimating that 14-23 % of pregnant women experience depression.31 But
even these estimates may be low as they include only reported cases.32 Indeed,
researchers in Great Britain have found that in the United Kingdom, suicide is the
leading cause of maternal death.33 In the United States, suicide is the second leading
cause of maternal death; the leading cause of maternal death is murder.34 Further, in
the United States maternal suicide is often related to domestic violence.35 A study
using data from the National Violent Death Reporting System found that “54.3% of
pregnancy-associated suicides involved intimate partner conflict that appeared to
contribute to the suicide.”36 In light of this reality, suicide and attempted suicide

exception to this general rule when acts of attempted suicide amount to criminal negligence,
e.g., attempting suicide with a gun in a crowed area and with knowledge of the danger to the
public).
30

Pam Belluck, ‘Thinking of Ways to Harm Her’: New Findings on Timing and Range of
Maternal Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/
health/thinking-of-ways-to-harmher.html?hp&_r=0.
31 Josie Pickens, Pregnancy and Suicide, EBONY, Aug. 2012, available at http://www.
ebony.com/wellness-empowerment/pregnancy-and-suicide-799#axzz39QwmJdGs.
Depression among women is quite prevalent in the general population: approximately 20% of
women in the general population experience major depressive disorder in their lifetimes. See
Samantha L. Illangasekare, et al., The Impact of Intimate Partner Violence, Substance Use,
and HIV on Depressive Symptoms Among Abused Low-Income Urban Women, 28 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 2831, 2832–33 (2013) (citing Ellen L. Bassuk, et al., Prevalence
of Mental Health and Substance Use Disorders Among Homeless and Low-Income Housed
Mothers, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1561 (1998) (finding that poor women had a higher level of
mental health disorders which resulted from trauma than other women, and that social
programs and policies for poor women should include mental health treatment). Among lowincome women the percentages of women who experience a major depressive disorder during
their lifetimes range from 43.8% to 45%. Id.
32

Pickens, supra note 31.

33

Margaret Oates, Suicide: The Leading Cause of Maternal Death, 183 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 279, 279 (2002).
34 See Christie Lancaster Palladino et al., Homicide and Suicide During the Perinatal
Period: Findings From the National Violent Death Reporting System, 118 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1056–63 (2011) (Studies show that about three out of every 100,000 women
who are pregnant or have a child less than one year old are murdered, and two out of every
100,000 kill themselves.). Pregnancy-associated homicide victims were significantly more
likely to be at the extremes of the age range and African American; and 45.3% of pregnancyassociated homicides were associated with intimate-partner violence. Id.; see also Kerry
Grens, Murder, Suicide Top Medical Deaths in Pregnancy, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2011, 6:17
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/26/us-deaths-pregnancyidUSTRE79P7OK20111026.
35
36

See Palladino, supra note 34, at 1056–63.

Id.; see also, Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrest of and Forced Interventions on
Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status
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among pregnant women should be seen not as a “choice” made in an attempt to harm
her fetus, but rather as a consequence of mental illness or domestic violence. Thus
we might better describe a pregnant woman who attempts suicide and harms her
fetus as a victim of mental illness or crime, rather than as a perpetrator of criminal
activity. Hence, instead of responding to attempted suicide among pregnant women
as a criminal law issue, we should respond to these issues using medical and public
health frameworks. To the extent that the criminal law is implicated, it should be
used to eliminate domestic violence perpetrated against pregnant women.
B. A Story about Drug and Alcohol Use: The Story of Rennie Gibbs
In 2006, a sixteen-year-old, crack-addicted, young woman named Rennie Gibbs
delivered a thirty-six-week-old stillborn baby.37 Although there was no evidence that
her drug use or addiction caused the stillbirth, Ms. Gibbs was arrested and charged
with depraved heart murder.38 Amici from physician and public health organizations,
including the American Medical Association, the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Public
Health Association, and the American Academy of Family Physicians, argued that
the charges against Ms. Gibbs should be dropped due to a multiplicity of medical
and public health concerns, including:
1. The problem of drug and alcohol abuse during pregnancy is a health issue
best addressed through education and community-based treatment, not
through the criminal justice system.
2. Drug and alcohol dependency is a medical condition, as such pregnant
women do not experience drug and alcohol addiction because they want to
harm their fetuses and children or because they don’t care about their
children.
3. Because drug and alcohol dependency is an addiction, the majority of people
who experience them cannot simply stop their drug and alcohol use on the
threat of arrest, prison, or other negative consequences.
4. Threats of criminal (or civil) prosecution have been shown to harm women
and children because it deters pregnant and parenting women from seeking
prenatal care and drug and alcohol treatment.39
and Public Health, 38 J. OF HEALTH, POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 309–311 (2013) (finding that in 9%
of arrests and forced interventions, domestic violence was mentioned).
37 Brief of Appellant at 1, Gibbs v. Mississippi, 2010-M-S19-SCT (Miss. 2010); Martin,
supra note 7.
38 Ed Pilkington, Outcry in America as Pregnant Women who Lose Babies Face Murder
Charges, THE GUARDIAN, (June 24, 2011), www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/24/americapregnant-women-murder-charges. One category of murder under the Mississippi statue is
“depraved heart” murder. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(b) (2000). Depraved heart is a
category of second degree murder. It occurs “where an individual under ’circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engaged in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the death of another . . .’” Clayton
v. State, 652 So.2d 720, 731-32 (Miss. 1995) (quoting State v. Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60 (Utah
1978)); see also LaFave, supra note 28, at 779–85 (addressing “depraved heart murder”).
39

Letter to Att’y Gen. of State of Tex., Press release, Nat’l Advoc. for Pregnant Women,
Over 70 Child Welfare and Public Health Organizations, Experts, and Advocates Condemn
The Prosecution of Pregnant Women in Texas, available at
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Perhaps most importantly, Amici noted the difficulty in determining the cause of
stillbirth.40 Even where a woman tests positively for cocaine during labor or
immediately post-partum, it is extremely difficult to establish that cocaine use was
the cause of death because a large variety of factors contribute to stillbirth.41
On April 3, 2014, a Mississippi judge ruled that the state’s murder case against
Ms. Gibbs was prohibited and dismissed the indictment.42 Nevertheless, the district
attorney reported that the state would indict Ms. Gibbs again, presumably this time
under the state’s abortion statute, which prohibits self-induced abortion, or
alternatively under the state’s feticide statute.43
Ms. Gibbs’s prosecution, like the criminal prosecution of other women who use
drugs while pregnant, is perplexing because much of it belies what researchers know
(and do not know) about the effects of illicit drug use on the developing fetus.44
Undeniably some fetuses are harmed by in utero exposure to alcohol, illicit drugs,
and other substances.45 Babies born to drug-dependent women can suffer from a host
of medical, developmental, and behavioral problems.46 However, not all children
born to women who used illicit drugs during their pregnancies are permanently
affected by that exposure.47 Not only is the presence and severity of these problems
http://www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/issues/texasprosecute.htm [hereinafter Letter to
Att’y Gen.]; Brief for Nat’l Ass’n. of Social Workers, et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Gibbs v. State, No. 2010-M-819-SCT (Miss.2010).
40
41

Id.
Id.; see also Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 242.

42

Order, State vs. Gibbs, No. 2007-0031-CR1, slip op. at 1 (Cir. Ct. Lowndes County
2014), available at http://www.cdispatch.com/news/article.asp?aid=32344. In Buckhalter v.
State, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s dismissal of indictment for
manslaughter under similar circumstances, but noted that the pregnant women could be
prosecuted under another section of the statute that criminalized abortions save those
performed by a licensed physician, or under the state’s feticide statute. Buckhalter v. State,
119 So. 3d 1015, 1018 (Miss. 2013).
43 Sarah Fowler, Judge Dismisses Rennie Gibbs' Depraved Heart Murder Case,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Apr. 3, 2014), www.cdispatch.com/news/article.asp?aid=32344.
44

NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, TOPICS IN BRIEF: PRENATAL EXPOSURE TO DRUGS OF
ABUSE (2011), http://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/prenatal.pdf.
45 Michelle Ungerer et al., In Utero Alcohol Exposure, Epigenetic Changes, and Their
Consequences, 35 ALCOHOL RESEARCH 37, 37 (2013); Sonia Minnes et al., Prenatal Tobacco,
Marijuana, Stimulant, and Opiate Exposure: Outcomes and Practice Implications. 6
ADDICTION SCI. & CLINICAL PRAC. 57, 57 (2011).
46 Victoria J. Swenson & Cheryl Crabbe, Pregnant Substance Abusers: A Problem That
Won’t Go Away, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 623, 626 (1994).
47 Marylou Behnke & Vincent Smith, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Prenatal Substance Abuse:
Short- and Long-term Effects on the Exposed Fetus, 131 PEDIATRICS, 1009, 1016 (2013);
Gideon Koren, et al., Bias Against the Null Hypothesis: The Reproductive Hazards of
Cocaine, 8677 LANCET 1440, 1440 (1989) (bias against studies finding no fetal harm with
maternal cocaine use may lead to a “distorted estimation of the teratogenic risk of cocaine”);
AM. COL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, OPIOID ABUSE, DEPENDENCE, AND
ADDICTION IN PREGNANCY, 2 (2012), http://www.acog.org/-/media/CommitteeOpinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/co524.pdf [hereinafter AM.
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dependent upon the nature of their mother’s drug use,48 there is evidence that
demonstrates that the link is itself uncertain.49
The harmful effect of alcohol on a developing fetus is much better understood.
Alcohol is a teratogen, an agent that causes malformation of the developing
embryo.50 Maternal alcohol consumption can result in developmental disabilities and
other disabling conditions in the resulting child. 51 But again, the gravity of these
problems is dependent on the nature of pregnant women’s alcohol consumption.52
Nevertheless, women who consume or are addicted to alcohol are less likely to be
subject to criminal prosecution.53
COL. OF OBGYN], (Concluding at with regard to opioid use, “[t]he observed birth defects
remain rare with a minute increase in absolute risk”).
48

See Swenson & Crabbe, supra note 46, at 628; see also AM. COL. OF OBGYN, supra
note 47, at 2 (providing studies indicating that while “chronic untreated heroin use is
associated with an increased risk to fetal growth restriction, abruption placentae, fetal death,
[and] preterm labor,” these effects may also be associated with “lifestyle issues.” (emphasis
added).
49 AM. COL. OF OBGYN, supra note 47, at 2 (discussing that case-control and prospective
studies have not confirmed association between maternal methamphetamine use and fetal
defects); Kenneth A. De Ville & Loretta M. Kopelman, Fetal Protection in Wisconsin’s
Revised Child Abuse Law: Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 336
(1999); see Kenneth A. DeVille and Loretta Kopelman, Moral and Social Issues Regarding
Pregnant Women Who Use and Abuse Drugs, 25 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY CLINIC OF
NORTH AMERICA 237, 237–54 (1998); see Lester et al., supra note 4; see LAURA E. GOMEZ,
MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG
EXPOSURE 23–24 (1997). Initial Studies by Dr. Ira Chasnoff and his colleagues suggested a
correlation between the use of cocaine during pregnancy and instances of premature birth, low
birth weight, and higher rates of physical, mental, and emotional problems. These claims have
been refuted by many other scientists. See, e.g., Jennifer Havens et al., Factors Associated
With Substance Use During Pregnancy: Results From a National Sample, 99 DRUG ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 89, 89–90 (2009); John P. Ackerman et al., A Review of the Effects of Prenatal
Cocaine Exposure Among School-Aged Children, 125 PEDIATRICS 554, 554 (2010); Stacy
Buckingham-Howes et al., Systematic Review of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure and Adolescent
Development, 131 PEDIATRICS 1917, 1917 (2013).
50

See Claire E. Dineen, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: The Legal and Social Responses to Its
Impact on Native Americans, 70 N.D. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1994).
51 Id. at 4 (“Fetal alcohol syndrome (or FAS) is the name given to a pattern of major and
minor physical malformations, growth deficiencies, and central nervous system abnormalities
caused by maternal alcohol use during pregnancy. FAS is well defined for the children most
severely affected by prenatal alcohol exposure.” Fetal alcohol effects or FAE is a milder or
more subtle form of FAS.). See also Karen K. Howell et al., Prenatal Alcohol Exposure and
Ability, Academic Achievement, and School Functioning in Adolescence: A Longitudinal
Follow-up, 31 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOLOGY 116, 116–21 (2006).
52 Claire E. Dineen, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: The Legal and Social Responses to Its
Impact on Native Americans, 70 N.D. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (1994); Colleen O'Leary et al.,
Prenatal Alcohol Exposure and Educational Achievement in Children Aged 8–9 Years, 132
PEDIATRICS 468, 471–72 (2013).
53 See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 36, at 310 (finding that only 10% of arrests and forced
interventions mentioned pregnant woman’s use of alcohol).
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Since the effects of alcohol and drug abuse on the fetus can vary widely, the
state’s actions regarding pregnant abusers are difficult to defend on a scientific basis.
Moreover, prosecution for drug addiction runs counter to the contemporary
understanding of the nature of addiction, particularly maternal drug addiction.54 Most
physicians understand drug addiction as an illness, one causing changes in the
structure and function of the brain.55 These changes are responsible for the cognitive
and emotional impairments suffered by those who are addicted to drugs and alcohol,
including the overwhelming drive to use these substances despite the medical, social,
and economic costs.56 Because addiction is as an illness, it cannot be simply ignored
or wished away,57 and even where treatment programs are available, rates of
recidivism remain high, even in the most promising cases.58 Moreover, relying on a
criminal law solution presumes that effective treatment is available and that the
pregnant woman willfully refuses to avail herself of it. This belief (in the widespread

54

Lester et al., supra note 4.

55

See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUGS, BRAINS, AND
BEHAVIOR: THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION 5 (2007), http://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/
files/soa_2014.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH] (defining drug addiction as a brain
disease); A.T. McLellan, et al., Drug Dependence, A Chronic Medical Illness: Implications
for Treatment, Insurance, and Outcomes Evaluation, 284 J. AMER. MED. ASS’N 1689, 1689
(2000) (acknowledging that, although often treated as an acute disease, drug addiction is better
understood as a chronic disease in need of long-term strategies of medication management and
monitoring); Ellen M. Weber, Bridging the Barriers: Public Health Strategies for Expanding
Drug Treatment in Communities, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 631, 638–39 (2005) (majority of
medical community considers addiction a disease of the brain). Moreover, both the World
Health Organization and the American Psychiatric Association classify drug and alcohol
addiction as disease/disorder. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 483 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5] (“The essential
feature of a substance abuse disorder is a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological
symptoms indicating that the individual continues using the substance despite significant
substance abuse-related problems”); WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE INTERNATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES 57 (10th ed.1994) [hereinafter ICD-10].
56 Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is A Brain Disease, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 75, 75 (2001),
http://www.issues.org/17.3/leshner.htm; see also NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 55 at 5
(defining drug addiction as a brain disease).
57

McLellan et al., supra note 55, at 1689 (treatment entails the implementation of longterm strategies of management and monitoring); Weber, supra note 55, at 638–39 (showing
that a majority of medical the community considers addiction a disease of the brain that
requires treatment for improvement of symptoms).
58 See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision
Processes, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1558, 1560 (2004) (“Addicts often express a desire to stop
using a substance permanently and unconditionally but are unable to follow through. Shortterm abstention is common while long-term recidivism rates are high.”); see also NAT’L INST.
OF HEALTH, supra note 55, at 26 (treatment does not cure all patients, but it does reduce drug
use by 40–60 percent); McLellan, supra note 55 (Although drug addiction is often treated as
an acute disease, it is better understood as a chronic disease in need of long-term strategies of
medication management and monitoring).
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availability of drug treatment programs for pregnant women) is inaccurate.59 As of
2007, only 14.1% of the mental health and substance abuse facilities in the United
States offered treatment programs specifically designed for pregnant and postpartum women. In real numbers, this amounts to only 1,926 out of a total of 13,648
facilities offering programs for pregnant addicts.60 Moreover, as of August 2014,
only nineteen states have at least one drug treatment program available to pregnant
women.61 And among those states, only eleven give priority admission to pregnant
women.62 Indeed, in at least two states, New York and Pennsylvania, pregnant
women have initiated class action lawsuits to gain access to treatment programs near
their residences.63
59 SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., OFFICE OF APPLIED
STUDIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT SERVICES 56 (2007), http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/07nssats/nssats2k7web.pdf.
60

Id.

61

GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2014: SUBSTANCE
ABUSE DURING PREGNANCY (2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SADP
.pdf; see also Janet W. Steverson & Traci Rieckmann, Legislating for the Provision of
Comprehensive Substance Abuse Treatment Programs 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 315
(2009).
62 GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 61. Eligibility for Medicaid benefits provides some
benefits to pregnant women. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Health Coverage
Options for Pregnant or Soon to Be Pregnant Women (last visited Sept. 26, 2014),
https://www.healthcare.gov/how-does-the-health-care-law-protect-me/summary-of-benefitsand-coverage; see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., GLOSSARY OF HEALTH
COVERAGE AND MEDICAL TERMS https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/
Downloads/uniform-glossary-final.pdf; Eligibility for Medicaid benefits provides some
benefits to pregnant women; U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs, Essential Health
Benefits (last visited Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/essential-healthbenefits/ (“States expanding their Medicaid programs must provide these benefits [essential
benefits, which include drug treatment and prenatal, postpartum, and postnatal care for mother
and child] to people newly eligible for Medicaid.”). Medicaid coverage does not guarantee
pregnant women access to treatment programs:

Given that Medicaid is one of the largest sources of funding for indigent women, one
would logically look to Medicaid to provide payment for treatment services.
Unfortunately, there are a variety of barriers to a woman in seeking payment for
treatment services through Medicaid. For example, Medicaid coverage for substance
abuse treatment is not mandated by federal law, thus, the states may choose to not
provide reimbursement for such services. Further, even if a state chooses to provide
reimbursement for treatment services, it will only receive federal reimbursement if the
patient is Medicaid-eligible and the treatment is provided under ‘a Medicaid service
category that qualifies for matching funds.’ Thus, a treatment might not be
reimbursable because the service was social rather than medical treatment; the client
was too old or too young to qualify; the provider was not Medicaid-qualified because
it did not meet the definition of medical practitioner; the facility provided room and
board, which may not be reimbursed if provided in certain types of facilities; or the
facility was too large.
Steverson & Rieckmann, supra note 61, at 331–32.
63 See RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL RIGHTS, 139–40
(2003).
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Even where treatment is available, programs are poorly equipped to deal with the
needs of many pregnant women, particularly pregnant women who are poor.64 The
costs and the lack of availability of childcare are prohibitive for many women.65
Moreover, a few drug treatment facilities are unwilling to treat pregnant women for
fear of tort liability.66 It cannot be assumed, therefore, that pregnant drug and alcohol
users who do not receive treatment have rejected medical assistance.67 Thus, criminal
penalties are utilized in this context, despite the limited availability of treatment that
could have ameliorated harm to the pregnant woman and her fetus.68
Perhaps, the use of criminal law sanctions in the United States to punish pregnant
women who use drugs is inevitable in light of the dominant social construction of
addiction. This construction stigmatizes the afflicted as weak, while at the same time
holding them responsible and consequently blameworthy.69 In other words, addicted
pregnant women are viewed as having a moral character too weak to halt their
addiction, but nevertheless are culpable for their addiction and the related
consequences of that addiction.70 Stigmatization is also severe for women because

64 AM. COL. OF OBGYN, supra note 47, at 2 (“The few drug treatment facilities in the
United States accepting pregnant women often do not provide child care, account for the
woman’s family responsibilities, or provide treatment that is affordable.”).
65 Steverson & Rieckmann, supra note 61, at 326, 334 (noting the lack of funding to create
the programs for women, the lack of funding for those women unable to pay for treatment,
and that the lack of childcare facilities within programs limit poor women’s access to
treatment); see also ROTH, supra note 63, at 139, 140 (noting in a previous study, in New
York City, 87% of drug treatment programs rejected Medicaid patients who were pregnant
and addicted to crack); see also Dennis Andrulis & Sarah Hopkins, Public Hospitals and
Substance Abuse Services for Pregnant Women and Mothers: Implications for Managed-Care
Programs and Medicaid, 78 J. URBAN HEALTH, 181, 181–82 (2001).
66 Lester et al., supra note 4, at 22; see also Schroedel & Fiber, supra note 4, at 225
(“Fears of insurance liability for drug-affected children are an important reason why many
treatment providers refuse to accept pregnant women in their programs.”). See also Carol Jean
Sovinski, The Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse: A Quick Fix to a Complex
Problem, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 107, 135 (1997).
67

Flavin & Paltrow, supra note 4, at 237 (“Along similar lines, women who do not receive
treatment for drug dependence cannot be assumed to have rejected treatment.”).
68 Id. at 226 (citing Illinois as an exception to this pattern). Neither the federal or state
governments have meaningfully increased the number of treatment spaces available to
pregnant women despite widespread acknowledgement of the need. See Schroedel & Fiber,
supra note 4, at 225.
69 See Michael Salter & Jan Breckenridge, Women, Trauma and Substance Abuse:
Understanding the Experiences of Female Survivors of Childhood Abuse in Alcohol and Drug
Treatment, 23 INT’L. J. SOC. WELFARE 165, 167 (2014) (Drug treatment programs offer
“punitive institutional cultures characterized by significant power differentials between
workers and clients.” This structure, with the client portrayed as weak and irresponsible, along
with the expectation that she remain “deferential, penitent and apologetic” or suffer
punishment, “provoked fear among women whose abuse histories gave them reason to be
distrustful of regimes of control and discipline.”).
70

Lester et al., supra note 4.
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the status of “female addict” represents “an array of derelictions from (female)
gender norms.”71
Stigmatization of the pregnant drug user is also an important step toward
legitimizing punitive sanctions.72 It does so by masking the circumstances under
which drug abuse occurs. As Seema Mohapatra notes, “women do not abuse drugs in
a vacuum. There are a variety of societal factors, such as poverty, domestic violence,
lack of social support and education, which relate to drug use.”73 The failure of the
criminal legal system to address these factors means that it cannot effectively
prevent harms that result from a pregnant woman’s drug use. Instead of helping
women who use drugs and alcohol while pregnant and their fetuses, the criminal
legal system simply targets these women for prosecution.74
Finally, punitive treatment of pregnant women who use or who are addicted to
drugs or alcohol is inappropriate because it harms both pregnant women and their
babies.75 Even those who subordinate the rights of women to those of the fetus
should be concerned with the costs to fetal health exacted by the punitive measures
of the criminal law. Professional medical and public health organizations have long
opposed the use of the criminal law against pregnant women who use drugs due to
possible adverse consequences for fetal health.76 For instance, the American Medical
Association, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the
American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Public Health Association have
all assailed the use of criminal law as a response to maternal drug use and
addiction.77 In public statements, each of these organizations has noted that
criminalization of maternal drug use and addiction leads to poor fetal outcomes –78
71 Salter & Breckenridge, supra note 69, at 171; see infra note 227 (providing text
regarding hegemonic gender norms); see also Elizabeth Ettorre, Revisioning Women and Drug
Use: Gender Sensitivity, Embodiment and Reducing Harm, Int’l J. of Drug Pol’y 327, 327–35
(2004); and infra Section III.
72

Salter & Breckenridge, supra note 69, at 165.

73

See, e.g., Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 253.

74

See ROTH, supra note 63, at 139.

75 See Doug McVay et al., Justice Policy Institute, Treatment or Incarceration? National
and State Findings on the Efficacy and Cost Savings of Drug treatment versus Imprisonment 4
(2004), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/04-01_rep_md
treatmentorincarceration_ac-dp.pdf (punishment is also inappropriate because it is ineffective
and costs more than would treatment).
76

Lester at al., supra note 4; see Ernest L. Abel, & Michael Kruger, Physician Attitudes
Concerning Legal Coercion of Pregnant Alcohol and Drug Abusers, 186 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
GYNECOLOGY 768, 768 (2002); see Letter to Att’y Gen., supra note 39.
77

Kristin Pulatie, The Legality of Drug-Testing Procedures for Pregnant Women, 10 AM.
MED. ASS’N J. OF ETHICS 41, 42 (2008); AM. COL. OF OBGYN, supra note 47, at 2; see also
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, DESCRIPTION OF AMICI CURIAE,
https://www.socialworkers.org/assets/secured/documents/ldf/briefDocuments/Aiowhi%20App
endix.pdf.
78 See Am. Med. Ass’n Bd.Trustees, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N, 2663 (1990); Comm. on Substance Abuse, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Drug
Exposed Infants, 86 PEDIATRICS 639 (1990); Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, Policy Statement No.
9020, Illicit Drug Use by Pregnant Women, (1990); Comm. on Ethics, Am. College of
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often by discouraging these women from seeking treatment because they fear legal
retribution.79 In the alternative, the aforementioned organizations recommend
education80 and referrals to voluntary treatment as a way of improving fetal
outcomes for pregnant women who use or who are addicted to drugs.81
C. Self-Induced Abortion: The Story of Kawana Ashley
While incidents of attempted suicide and drug use among pregnant women are
intended primarily to affect the pregnant woman, cases involving self-induced
abortion are different. In these cases, the pregnant woman’s behavior is aimed more
directly toward the fetus – the purpose of the woman’s action is destruction of the
fetus. Nevertheless, there are important similarities to the cases outlined above. Like
the pregnant women who attempt suicide and those who use drugs and alcohol,
women who induce their own abortions are acting in response to similar social
pressures, such as shame and despair. As a result, these women are willing to risk
grievous bodily harm to avoid the social stigma that may accompany an unintended
pregnancy.82 Thus, even in cases involving self-induced abortion, our attention
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Committee Opinion No. 321, Maternal Decision Making,
Ethics and Law, 106 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1127 (2005).
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have issued several critical
statements of the current approach of the criminal legal system to maternal drug and alcohol
use. See, e.g., Comm. on Health Care for Underserved Women, Am. College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, Committee Opinion No. 473, Substance Abuse Reporting and Pregnancy:
The Role of the Obstetrician-Gynecologists (2001) (“Drug enforcement policies that deter
women from seeking prenatal care are contrary to the welfare of the mother and fetus.
Incarceration and the threat of incarceration have proved to be ineffective in reducing the
incidence of alcohol or drug use.”).
79

Cynthia Dailard & Elizabeth Nash, State Responses to Substance Abuse Among
Pregnant Women, 3 GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, no. 6, Dec. 2010 (noting South
Carolina experienced an 80% reduction of pregnant women admissions into drug treatment
programs after aggressive prosecution of pregnant drug users in the state); Mohapatra, supra
note 4, at 254.
80 See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics, How Pediatricians Can Help Babies
Exposed to Drugs (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-pressroom/Pages/How-Pediatricians-Can-Help-Babies-Exposed-to-Drugs.aspx. (recommending
partnering with government and other health care providers to educate women and providers
regarding problem and treatment); Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, supra note 78 (encouraging
educational programs, community outreach, and availability of drug treatment facilities).
81 See, e.g., Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, supra note 78; Comm. on Ethics, Am. College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Committee Opinion No. 422, At-Risk Drinking and Illicit
Drug Use: Ethical Issues in Obstetric and Gynecologic Practice (Dec. 2008),
http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-onEthics/At-Risk-Drinking-and-Illicit-Drug-Use-Ethical-Issues-in-Obstetric-and-GynecologicPractice; Comm. on Health Care for Underserved Women, Am. College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, Committee Opinion No. 479, Methamphetamine Abuse in Women of
Reproductive Age (2011); Comm. on Health Care for Underserved Women, Am. College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Committee Opinion No. 524, Opioid Abuse, Dependence, and
Addiction in Pregnancy (2012).
82 Letter to Att’y Gen., supra note 39. In can be argued that they are making double-bind
choices – choices that exposes a person to “[s]ituations in which options are reduced to a very
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would be better focused on viewing the behavior of the pregnant woman as selfharming, rather than behavior primarily designed to harm the fetus. Not only would
such a focus increase the quality of women’s health, it would also decrease the
number of situations in which fetuses are subject to harmful prenatal maternal
behavior.
The 1997 Florida case of a young, unmarried teenager named Kawana Ashley
provides an example of circumstances that may lead to incidents of self-induced
abortion.83 Ms. Ashley shot herself in the abdomen with a .22 caliber gun when she
was twenty-five weeks pregnant.84 The gunshot injured her fetus in the wrist, and
forced delivery of the fetus via an emergency caesarian section.85 Fifteen days later,
the child died as a result of its premature birth.86
Unlike Ms. Shuai, Ms. Ashley did not try to kill herself.87 She shot herself in an
attempt to terminate her pregnancy, believing that her pregnancy had advanced
beyond the time frame in which she could obtain a legal abortion.88 Ms. Ashley was
arrested and charged with a violation of the state’s criminal abortion statute “by
performing a third-trimester abortion on herself with a .22 caliber firearm without
certification of necessity by two physicians,”89 felony murder, and manslaughter.90

few and all of them expose one to penalty, censure, or deprivation,” and as such, are
emblematic of oppression. MARILYN FRYE, Oppression, in THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS
IN FEMINIST THEORY 1, 2 (1983).
83 State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, (Fla.1997) (per curiam). The case of a pregnant
seventeen-year-old, who desperately wanted to end her pregnancy, hired a man to beat her in
an attempt to terminate the pregnancy represents a similar approach to self-induced abortion.
The young woman allegedly hired the man after her boyfriend told her that he would leave her
if she did not “get rid of the baby.” She paid the man $150 and he kicked her in the stomach 5
times (he also bit her on the neck – I’m unsure what that had to do with ending the
pregnancy). Both the pregnant teenager and the fetus survived, but teenager was charged with
2nd degree felony criminal solicitation to commit murder. She pled no contest to the charges
and was initially placed in confinement until the age of 21. The Utah State Attorney General
actually appealed the Juvenile Court Judge’s opinion – and the judge reversed himself, and
released the young woman after being convinced that under Utah law pregnant women cannot
be held criminally liable for seeking to obtain an abortion for herself. See, National Advocates
for Pregnant Women, Utah Bill Creating the Crime of Criminal Homicide of an Unborn Child
will Affect all Pregnant Women, (Jan. 12, 2010), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/main
/publications/fact_sheets/utah_bill_creating_the_crime_of_criminal_homicide_of_an_unborn
_child_will_affect_all_pregnant_women.php.
84

State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d at 339.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

88
Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishment and Prejudice: Judging Drug-Using Pregnant Women, in
MOTHER TROUBLES: RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MATERNAL DILEMMAS 59 (Julia E.
Hanigsgerg & Sara Ruddick eds., 1999).
89

State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 340.

90

Id. at 341–42.
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Although the trial court dismissed the murder charge against the teenager, it
proceeded with the manslaughter charge.91
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow a manslaughter
charge to go forward, but it certified two questions to the Florida Supreme Court for
its review, namely: (1) “may an expectant mother be criminally charged with the
death of her born alive child resulting from self-inflicted injuries during the third
trimester of pregnancy”; and (2) “[i]f so, may she be charged with manslaughter or
third-degree murder, the underlying predicate felony being abortion or attempted
abortion?”92 Reasoning that the criminal law regarding abortion was “intended to
protect, not punish” pregnant women, the Florida Supreme Court answered the first
question in the negative.93 The second question was thus rendered moot.94 As a result
of the Florida Supreme Court decision, Ms. Ashley was not prosecuted for her
attempted self-induced abortion. Nevertheless, her arrest and indictment are
illustrative of how some prosecutors approach the issue of self-induced abortion.95
Prosecutions for self-induced abortion continue where criminal statutes do not
expressly exempt women from criminal liability.96
The issue of self-induced abortion97 has not garnered much attention since the
landmark Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade.98 Perhaps we have assumed that
91

Id. at 341.

92

Id. at 340.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

“Self-induced abortion,” also called “self-abortion,” is an abortion performed without
the assistance of medical professionals. The term does not include medical abortions, where
abortion is achieved with the use of the lawfully prescribed drug mifepristone, which is also
known as “RU-486.” Self-induced abortion does not include the use of “emergency
contraception,” commonly known as the “morning after pill.” Methods of self-induced
abortion include the ingestion of drugs and other substances; insertion of implements into the
uterine cavity; and infliction of physical trauma, including blows to the abdomen. See Daniel
Grossman, et al., Self-Induction of Abortion Among Women in the United States, 18
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 136, 138–40 (2010); see also Erica Hellerstein, The Rise of
the DIY Abortion in Texas, THE ATLANTIC, (Jun. 27, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/
archive/2014/06/the-rise-of-the-diy-abortion-in-texas/373240/ (Texas experiences a rise in
self-induced abortion with the closing of abortion clinics); see also Teresa A. Saultes, Diane
Devita, & Jason D. Heiner, The Back Alley Revisited: Sepsis After Attempted Self-Induced
Abortion, 10 WESTERN J. OF EMERGENCY MED. 278 (2009) (looking at a case study of patient
who self-aborted).
96

Arrest and prosecution for self-induced abortion continues to be a possibility in the
thirty-nine states that require an abortion to be performed by a licensed physician. See
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF AS OF OCTOBER 1, 2014: AN OVERVIEW OF
ABORTION LAWS (2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf.
Alabama, Arizona, and Delaware statutes are examples of statutes that on their face prohibit
self-induced abortion. ALA. CODE §13A-13-7 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603
(1978); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 652 (1995). See also McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d
1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2012).
97

Self-induced abortion continues to be practiced worldwide where abortion is
criminalized or access to abortion services is restricted by age, status, or by economic
circumstances. See M.S. Coles, & L.P. Koenigs, Self-Induced Medical Abortion in an
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self-induced abortion itself was a thing of the past,99 only necessary in the pre-Roe
era when most abortions were criminalized.100 On the contrary, self-induced
abortions continue to occur in the United States.101 These abortions often occur
among women who are unable to afford or access legal abortions.102
Self-induced abortions are gravely dangerous to the women who attempt them.
Women who attempt self-induced abortion risk serious health complications,
including infection and infertility.103 They also face an increased risk of death from
hemorrhage, infection, embolism, septic shock, and sepsis.104 Moreover,
criminalization of self-induced abortion may lead to increased maternal mortality
because women who find that they need medical help after attempting to self-abort
may be hesitant to seek assistance – they may fear that hospitals will turn them over
to the police.105
Adolescent, 20 J. PED. ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY 93, 93 (2007); Jane Parker Smith, Risky
Choices: The Dangers of Teens Using Self-Induced Abortion Attempts, 12 J. PEDIATRIC
HEALTH CARE 147 (1998); Benjamin Honigman, Guillermo Davila, & Janice Petersen,
Reemergence of Self-Induced Abortion, 11 J. EMERGENCY MED. 105 (1993).
98

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

99

Saultes et al., supra note 95, at 279 (suggesting that the rate of mortality due to sepsis in
patients that self-abort is as high as 20–50%).
100 Although Roe v. Wade is often thought to stand for the proposition of that abortion was
legalized in the United States, in fact the Court in Roe decriminalized only abortions
performed by licensed medical professionals, and then only those performed during the first
and second trimesters. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973).
101

Grossman et al., supra note 95, at 140–42.

102 Id. (noting that the women interviewed cited avoidance of abortion clinic, obstacles to
accessing clinic services caused by age and finances, as well as a preference for self-induction
as reasons for self-induced abortion).
103

Honigman et al., supra note 97, at 108.

104

Id. Fetal harm may also result even if the abortion is unsuccessful. See, Helen C. Pymar
& Mitchell D. Creinin, Alternatives to Mifepristone regimes for Medical Abortion, 183 AM. J.
OBSTET. GYNECOL. 54 (2000) (While some data suggests an increase in limb reduction
abnormalities among fetuses examined after failed abortion with the drugs methotrexate and
misoprostol. Other studies have found no significant differences in the rates of major or minor
abnormalities in misoprostol-exposed and unexposed newborns).
105 As of the time of the writing of this essay, the State of Indiana has charged a thirty-three
year-old woman, Purvi Patel, with feticide, a class B felony that carries a prison sentence of 8
to 20 years. She was also charged with criminal child neglect, Indiana Code 35-46-1-4(b) (3),
a class A felony that carries a potential prison sentence of up to fifty years. Information for
Neglect of a Dependent at 1, State v. Patel, No. 71 D08-1307-FA-000017, (Sup. Ct. St. Joseph
County 2013 (available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1280086patelpcaffidavit.html). The state alleges that Patel took several drugs in an attempt to
terminate her pregnancy and in doing so either killed her at least 28 week-old fetus, or that the
child was born alive and was then neglected causing its death. This case came to the attention
of law enforcement after Patel, bleeding from her vagina, went to an emergency room for
treatment. Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Probable Cause at 1, State v. Patel, No. 71
D08-1307-FA-000017, (Sup. Ct. St. Joseph County 2013) (Available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1280086-patelpcaffidavit.html). See also Ed
Pilkington, Indiana Woman Charged with Feticide after Unborn Child's Death, THE

2015]

FROM RETRIBUTION TO SOCIAL JUSTICE

25

Although fetal rights rhetoric insists that cases of self-induced abortion be
punished because of the fetal harm or death that results, there is an alternative to this
approach. Instead of viewing cases involving self-induced abortion as being
primarily about fetal harm, they may be better understood as being a result of the
inaccessibility of legal abortion in the United States despite the decriminalization of
early abortion in Roe.106 Cases of self-induced abortion demonstrate the difficulty
that some women have in accessing safe and legal abortion because of social,
economic, and legal constraints. The social weight of shame prevents some women
from seeking legal abortion.107 Economic constraints caused by poverty also prevent
some women from accessing legal abortions.108 Finally, some women may resort to
GUARDIAN, Aug. 26, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/26/indiana-womanfeticide-charge.
106

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

107

“Sidewalk Counseling” is a common tactic among anti-choice activists. These activists
talk to and yell at clients are entering or trying to enter an abortion clinic, in an effort to
persuade them not to have an abortion. Although anti-choice organizations often assert that
such “counseling” is done in a “quiet and friendly manner.” See Judith Fetrow, The Sidewalk
Counselor's Guidebook, AM. LIFE LEAGUE (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.all.org/article/index/
id/MjM4OA. During oral arguments before the Supreme Court in McCullen v. Coakley,
Justice Scalia described anti-choice sidewalk counseling: "[W]hat these people want to do is
to speak quietly and in a friendly manner, not in a hostile manner, because that would frustrate
their purpose, with the people going into the clinic." Transcript of Oral Argument at 32,
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12–1168 Justice Scalia’s description of the
practice belies the reality. Anti-choice activists are often angry, shouting, and accusing. Their
purpose is to shame women and stop them from accessing abortion services. See Dean
Obeidallah, The Loud Truth Abort Abortion Protestors, DAILY BEAST, (Jan. 22, 2014),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/22/the-loud-truth-about-abortion-protesters
.html.Anti-choice activists are also known to engage in physical violence. The National
Abortion Federation complies statistics on acts of violence toward abortion clinics and
abortion providers including murder, attempted murder, bombing, arson, assault and battery,
hate mail, and bomb threats. See National Abortion Federation, NAF VIOLENCE AND
DISRUPTION STATISTICS: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE & DISRUPTION AGAINST ABORTION
PROVIDERS IN THE U.S. & CANADA (2009), http://prochoice.org/wp-content/uploads/
violence_stats.pdf.
108

To the extent that the poorest women receive health care, that health care is funded by a
joint federal-state program: Medicaid. More than seven million women of reproductive age,
approximately 12% of all American women of reproductive age, are enrolled in the Medicaid
program. Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter: Public Funding of Abortion for Poor
Women in the United States, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., no 1, Winter 2007,, 12 . Under this
program, federal law severely restricts the use of federal funds for the provision of abortion
services. The Hyde Amendment, initially passed in 1976, limited federal funding for abortions
except for cases in which the pregnant woman’s life was threatened by the continuation of the
pregnancy. Pub.L.96-123, §109, 93, Stat. 926 (1976). Since then, the Hyde Amendment, with
small modifications, has been renewed every year. The current version of the Amendment
forbids the use of federal funds for abortions except for cases of life in which the pregnant
woman’s life is endangered by a continuation of the pregnancy, or where the pregnancy was
the result of rape or incest. With regard to life endangering conditions, the current statute
permits payment with federal funds only when the pregnant woman’s life is threatened by a
“physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering physical
condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.” Departments of Labor, Health and
Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L.
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self-induced abortion because of burdensome state regulation.109 Many abortion
regulations deemed constitutional, including mandatory waiting periods, counseling
requirements, and “TRAP” laws,110 constitute significant barriers to safe, legal, and
early abortion for poor and low income women.111 Thus, stories about self-induced
abortion should be more readily understood as resulting from the lack of
comprehensive health care, including reproductive healthcare, for women across the
socio-economic spectrum.
The preceding cases of Shuai, Gibbs, and Ashley provide a good opportunity to
consider why pregnant women lack adequate access to healthcare, including mental
healthcare, substance abuse treatment, and reproductive healthcare. I believe that the
influences of the fetal personhood rhetoric and maternal deviance rhetoric both play
a part in this deprivation.
III. THE RHETORIC OF FETAL PERSONHOOD AND THE USE OF FETAL PROTECTION
MEASURES AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN
There is much debate in contemporary society about the status of the human
embryo and fetus. In large part, this debate revolves around questions of personhood
No. 111-8, § 507(b), 123 Stat. 524, 802. See also, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
(upholding constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment).
109 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of SE. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992)
(permitting state regulations so long as regulation purpose or effect is not to place a
“substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability”); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 127 (2007) (upholding constitutionality of state ban
on so called “partial birth abortion”). But see Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, No.
13-60599, 2014 WL 3730467, at *10 (5th Cir. July 29, 2014) (holding that regulations which
will cause the closure of Mississippi’s only abortion clinic comprise “an undue burden on a
woman’s right to choose an abortion in Mississippi, and is therefore unconstitutional as
applied to the plaintiffs in this case.”).
110

A recent trend amongst state legislatures is the passage of targeted regulation of
abortion providers, or “TRAP” laws. These laws single out the medical practices of doctors
who provide abortions, and impose different and more burdensome regulations on them than
those imposed on other physicians and medical practices.; CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS, BRIEFING PAPER, TARGETED REGULATION OF ABORTION PROVIDERS: AVOIDING THE
“TRAP” 1 (2003), http://http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/
documents/pub_bp_avoidingthetrap.pdf; Carol M. Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory
Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 408 (2008) See generally
SARA DUBOW, OURSELVES UNBORN: A HISTORY OF THE FETUS IN MODERN AMERICA (2011)
(providing a detailed account of this trend in legislation). An example of a particularly
egregious piece of TRAP legislation was Virginia’s pre-abortion ultrasound statutory proposal
which required women to whose pregnancies were less than 8 weeks to undergo a highly
invasive transvaginal ultrasound before an abortion could be performed, even though
ultrasounds under these conditions have not been deemed medically necessary and are
contrary to guidelines published by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.
See Rick Ungar, Virginia’s Pre-Abortion Ultrasound Law Medically Unsound-Violates
Guideline of American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, FORBES MAG.
Forbes.com, Mar. 8, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/03/08/virginias-preabortion-ultrasound-law-medically -unsound-violates-guidelines-of-american-college-ofobstetricians-and-gynecologists/.
111 See Kate Gerasley, The Pearl of the ‘Pro-Life’ Movement? Reflections on the Kermit
Grisnell Controversy, 40 J. MED. ETHICS 419, 420–21 (2014).
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and resulting legal and moral rights.112 Although much of the rhetoric regarding
embryonic and fetal personhood can be found in debates about abortion, human
cloning, and embryo experimentation,113 it also underlies the use of fetal protection
measures against pregnant women, including charges of fetal neglect and fetal
homicide.114 In this section, I analyze contemporary fetal personhood rhetoric and
the ways in which this rhetoric, despite its limitations, has been translated into the
law, specifically fetal homicide statutes.
A. Fetal Personhood Rhetoric and Critique
While a comprehensive review and analysis of the philosophical and ethical
literature examining moral personhood is beyond the scope of this essay, it is
important to note that within that literature, much debate exists regarding the
appropriate basis for recognizing moral and legal personhood status. These debates
include: debates centered on religious and ethical views;115 scientific explanations;116
112 See generally Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for
Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369 (2007); see generally ABORTION RIGHTS AND FETAL
“PERSONHOOD” (Edd Doerr & James W. Prescott eds., 2nd. ed. 1990).
113

See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, 31
FLA. ST. U. L. REV 101, 101–02 (2003) (“Two debates, one about abortion and the other about
embryonic stem cell research and therapeutic cloning, are being conflated in social and legal
discourse.”).
114

See, e.g., Margaret Kelly, Increasing Victimization Through Fetal Abuse Redefinition,
20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 685 (2014) (examining the ways in which women are held
accountable for their failure to protect their fetuses from domestic violence and how women
have been prosecuted for legal behavior during pregnancy, such as drinking alcohol, by the
same officers summoned to the home for a domestic violence situation); Juliana Vines Crist,
The Myth of Fetal Personhood: Reconciling Roe and Fetal Homicide Laws, 60 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 851 (2010) (arguing that fetal homicide laws do not undermine boundaries of the fetus
as a juridical person, and thus they do not subordinate to the pregnant woman).
115

See, e.g., Catechism of the Catholic Church, Abortion § 2270 (“Human life must be
respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception. From the first moment of
his existence, a human being must be recognized as having the rights of a person - among
which is the inviolable right of every innocent being to life.); John Noonan, Abortion and the
Catholic Church: A Summary History, 12 NAT. L. F. 5, 126 (1967) (addressing moral
personhood; arguing that since the embryo and fetus is conceived by human beings, it is a
human being); see, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO: A DEFENSE
OF HUMAN LIFE 50, 123 (2008) (“Since human beings are intrinsically valuable and deserving
of full moral respect by virtue of what they are, it follows that they are intrinsically valuable
from the point at which they come into being.”).
116 For example, neuroscientist Michael Bennett argues that “[f]rom a neuroscientific and
behavioral point of view, personhood develops over the months or year or two when the baby
is beginning to recognize its parents, feel fear, joy and anger, and to put its feelings into
words.” Michael V.L. Bennett Personhood From a Neuroscientific Perspective, in ABORTION
RIGHTS AND FETAL “PERSONHOOD” 78, 78–79 (Edd Doerr & James W. Prescott eds., 2nd. ed.,
1990).

One the other hand, psychologist Paul Bloom argues that the question, ‘when does life
begin’, is not relevant to what people think of as personhood. Rather, Bloom believes that the
question is a spiritual question that science cannot answer. Paul Bloom, The Duel Between
Body and Soul, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/10/opinion/
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functional views such as that moral personhood can be defined by a collection of
functions or abilities,117 or the potential capacity to attain those functions or
abilities;118 and debates incorporating some amalgamation of the preceding bases.119
Where the basis for moral personhood has a religious underpinning, the fetus is often
viewed as having the status of moral personhood.120 On the other hand, where the
basis of personhood is scientific or functional, the fetus is not normally imbued with
personhood status.121
Outside of the academy, much of the contemporary rhetoric regarding fetal
personhood combines a call in favor of the recognition of moral personhood with a
recognition of legal personhood, including legal rights for the fetus.122 Much of this
rhetoric and activism can be found under the banner of the “right to life” or “pro-

10bloomhtml?pagewanted=1&mabReward=relbias:r,{%221%22:%22RI:9%22}&module=Se
arch.
117 See, e.g., Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, 57 The
Monist 4, 5 (1973) (arguing there are five indicia of personhood: consciousness, reasoning,
self-motivated activity, capacity to communicate, and presence of self-concepts and selfawareness); Joseph Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man, Hastings
Center Rep., at 1–2 (1972) (arguing that there are four indicia of personhood: minimum
intelligence, self-awareness, sense of time, and the ability to relate to others); Joseph Fletcher,
Four Indicators of Humanhood – The Enquiry Matures, 4(6) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 4–7
(arguing that higher brain or neocortical function – that is required for volition – is the most
important indicia of personhood).
118 See, e.g., Lawrence Becker, Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept, 4 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 334, 352 (Summer, 1975).
119

Scholar Ronald Green may be an example of this approach. In his book, Green argues
that judgments regarding personhood status are “the outcome of complex moral choice
involving many competing considerations. Sometimes these consideration have less to do with
the nature of the entity than with the implications of a boundary maker itself.” RONALD M.
GREEN, THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH DEBATES: BIOETHICS IN THE VORTEX OF
CONTROVERSY 49 (2001).
120

See, e.g., id, at 31 (“Roman Catholic theorists are particularly sensitive to [the
appearance of the embryo at fertilization marking the beginning of a new human individual
that merits some degree of moral protection]. Catholic theology defines the human soul as ‘an
individual substance of a rational nature.’ The soul is an individual reality, and every human
individual can have only one soul . . . This is a metaphysical question pertaining to religious
faith, not something that can be determined by the means available to those who must form
public policy.”).
121 See, e.g., id. at 25 (Personhood is a legal status given by “a pluralistic society in which
people hold very different views.”); see also GREEN, supra note 119, at 49 (“[There is, among
both conservatives and liberals, a] failure to realize that the judgments of ‘humanity,’
‘personhood,’ or any similar determination of moral protectedness are not a matter of
definition, of finding the intrinsic biological property of an entity that makes it morally
protectable, but are instead the outcome of a complex moral choice involving many competing
considerations.”).
122 Mary Jo Neitz, Family, State, and God: Ideologies of the Right-to-Life Movement, 42
Sociological Analysis 265, 265 (1981).
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life” movement.123 By and large, the right to life movement is both a social and
political movement. It bases its fetal personhood and fetal rights stance on a
conservative religious doctrine, which posits that the fetus is a moral person and as
such is entitled to legal personhood with its concomitant legal rights and protections,
including protections from physical harm by its mother.124
Many aspects of the fetal personhood rhetoric are troubling. For example, the
contemporary fetal personhood rhetoric fails to consider that there may be a
difference between legal and moral personhood. It is not self-evident that they are
equivalents. In other words, the fetal personhood rhetoric conflates the two concepts,
or at the very least glosses over important distinctions between them. Further, this
analysis fails to consider why a fetus might be accorded moral personhood status but
not imbued with legal rights.125
Moreover, much of the fetal rights rhetoric ignores the differences between the
two types of legal persons – natural persons (generally a function of live human
birth) and juridical persons (entities given some of the characteristics and rights of
personhood due to their legal interests, such as corporations). 126 This demarcation
123 In this section I am referring to the American pro-life/right to life movement as both a
social and political movement. Although the movement consists of various pro-life
organizations that hold diverse rationales for their right to life position, their common goal has
been to oppose abortion on moral or religious grounds. Id. (arguing that there are two different
conceptual frameworks in the right to life movement: a “pro-life” contingent, and a “profamily contingent). Nevertheless, members of the right to life movement seem to share three
central beliefs (which are often conflated): 1) that human life begins at conception; 2) that the
human fetus (and in most cases the embryo) is a person; and 3) that because the fetus is a
person, it has both a moral and legal right to life. Right to life organizations include
organizations such as Operation Rescue, http://www.operationrescue.org/; Americans United
for Life, http://www.aul.org; The National Right to Life Convention, http://nrlconvention.
com/; The National Right to Life Committee, http://www.nrlc.org/; The United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops, http://www.usccb.org/; Focus on the Family,
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/; Concerned Women of America,
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/; and Feminists for Life, http://www.feministsforlife.org/.
124 See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 119, at 37 (“If, from fertilization onward, the embryo inside
a woman’s womb were regarded as her moral equivalent, every conflict between the fetus and
pregnant woman would require careful determination of whose health and survival should
take precedence. If a woman’s other interests clashed with the moral claims of the embryo or
fetus, those interests could be overridden.”).
125

For example, the Supreme Court has held that the fetus, regardless of its stage of
development, is not a legal person with legal rights. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158–59
(1973) (“the word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the
unborn”). See also LAURENCE B. MCCULLOUGH & FRANK A CHERVENAK, ETHICS IN
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 105 (1994) (“There is no compelling reason in bioethics, as a
philosophical intellectual undertaking, for the physician, the pregnant woman, or anyone
else—the male gamete donor, family members, or the state, in particular—to regard the
previable fetus as independently possessing, lacking, or possessing only to some degree, the
moral status of being a patient.”).
126

In American law legal “personhood” is understood and conveyed by the doctrines of
“natural” personhood or “juridical” personhood. Natural personhood is limited to people and
is conferred upon birth. Berg, supra note 112, at 372–73 (2007). By contrast, juridical
personhood is a legal mechanism by which a state may give limited rights (such as the right to
sue and be sued) to entities that are not natural persons. Crist, supra note 114, at 864 (“They
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between natural and juridical persons is critical because where an entity is deemed a
juridical person, its rights are generally understood to be subordinate to the rights of
natural persons.127 Under this framework, the fetus that the state seeks to protect via
fetal endangerment and homicide laws is not a natural person.128 It may, arguably, be
a juridical person; but, even then, its rights should be limited, as “natural persons are
entitled to priority over juridical persons in a hierarchy of rights.”129 Indeed, one
commentator, Juliana Crist, argues that the law should recognize juridical
personhood in the fetus as a way of protecting the pregnant woman’s interests in her
fetus, stating:
The fetus, like the corporation, is not entitled to protections because of
what it is innately. Instead, the law recognizes that there is a natural
person, the mother, who has fundamental interests at stake. Her rights are
invested in another entity, the fetus. The law gives that entity juridical
personhood to ensure that the rights of the mother may be secured, just as
the law gives the corporation juridical personhood to protect the rights of
shareholders.130
Within Crist’s understanding of fetal personhood, fetal homicide laws can exist
only to protect the pregnant woman’s interest in her pregnancy as against outsiders,
and thus cannot be used against her for any damage done to the fetus by her own
behavior.
B. Translating Fetal Personhood Values into the Law: Feticide/Fetal
Homicide Laws
Despite the absence of legal personhood status in the fetus, both civil and
criminal penalties have been exacted against women who have used drugs or alcohol
are creatures of the state, and as such are limited to whatever rights the state chooses to give or
not give them.”). Corporations are entities that operate in this latter category.
127 Generally, the rights conveyed through a recognition of juridical personhood are inferior
(or fewer) than those rights conveyed by natural personhood. However, there are
circumstances in which the rights accorded by juridical personhood are equivalent/equal to
those convey to natural persons – when the according equal rights are justified by the nature
of their interests. Berg, supra note 112, at 374. As Berg notes:

This is not to say that juridical persons might not be granted equal rights with natural
persons, but that such allocation of rights would have to be justified by the interests
involved. In other words, natural persons function as the baseline against which other
rights allocations are judged. Our society was developed by and for natural persons,
and thus legal rights focus on this group.
Id.
Moreover, the distinction between natural persons and juridical persons is important
because even if the fetus is not deemed a natural person (because it has not yet been born
live), the fetus might be deemed a juridical person and if the state deems appropriate, imbued
with limited legal rights and obligations. Id. at 39192.
128

See Wade, 410 U.S. at 158.

129

Berg, supra note 112, at 372–73.

130

Crist, supra note 114, at 858.
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during their pregnancies. Where the civil penalties have been imposed, they have
been severe.131 Sanctions have included civil commitment and incarceration during
pregnancy for the benefit of fetal health, and civil orders requiring submission to a
physician’s orders.132 In the family law context, the punishment of women for their
behavior while pregnant is frequently manifested by removal of the child (directly
after its birth) from its mother.133 In this context, the fetus is constructed either as a
child who has been abused and neglected, or the prenatal maternal behavior is used
as proof of the likelihood of child abuse or neglect if the newborn is permitted to
remain with its mother.134 Women of color are more vulnerable to this sort of state
action than white women.135 In fact, a 1990 study found that while white and black
women have similar rates of illicit drug use during pregnancy, black women were
ten times more likely to be reported to county child protection authorities.136
131 LYNN M. PALTROW, DAVID S. COHEN & CORINNE A. CAREY, YEAR 2000 OVERVIEW:
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO PREGNANT WOMEN WHO USE ALCOHOL OR OTHER DRUGS 4
(2000), available at http://www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles/gov_
response_review.pdf.
132

See Cherry, The Detention, supra note 2, at 159.

133 Eighteen states (Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin) have deemed drug use during pregnancy as child
abuse under their civil child abuse and neglect statutes. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 61.
Others, namely Minnesota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin also have specific statutes
permitting civil commitment of pregnant women who used drugs. See Dailard & Nash, supra
note 79, at 2, 4–5.
134 The South Dakota and Illinois child abuse and neglect statutes are examples of this
approach. In the South Dakota statute, the term “abused or neglected child,” includes a
newborn “[w]ho was subject to prenatal exposure to abusive use of alcohol, marijuana, or any
controlled drug or substance not lawfully prescribed by a practitioner.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
26-8A-2(9) (West 1998). In Illinois, under 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(c), a neglected minor
includes:

any newborn infant whose blood, urine, or meconium contains any amount of a
controlled substance as defined in subsection (f) of Section 102 of the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act, as now or hereafter amended, or a metabolite of a
controlled substance, with the exception of controlled substances or metabolites of
such substances, the presence of which in the newborn infant is the result of medical
treatment administered to the mother or the newborn infant.
See also In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462, 464–65 (Ohio 2000) (Although court
found “that the issue is not whether a fetus is a child but rather whether the plain language of”
the statute applies to newborns, it nevertheless held that when newborn toxicology yields a
positive result for illicit drug, the newborn is per se an abused child); Dailiard & Nash, supra
note 79, at 3.
135 See generally Ira J. Chasnoff, Harvey J. Landress & Mark E. Barrett, The Prevalence of
Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in
Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J.MED. 1202, 1205 (1990).
136 Id. Of the 715 women enrolled for prenatal care at the five public health clinics and
twelve private obstetrical offices in Pinellas County, 15.4% of white women and 14.1% of
African-American women showed positive toxicological results for the presence of alcohol,
cannabinoids, cocaine, or opiates. Nevertheless, only1.1% of white women were tested, as
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As the cases of Shuai, Gibbs, and Ashley demonstrate, pregnant women accused
of endangering the life or health of their fetuses also have been punished via the
criminal law.137 Although presently only one jurisdiction, the state of Tennessee, has
enacted a statute that directly and explicitly criminalizes illicit drug use during
pregnancy,138 many other states have used the criminal law as a way to criminalize
drug and alcohol use by pregnant women.139 For example, pregnant women who use
illicit substances during pregnancy have been prosecuted for delivery of drugs to a
minor, corruption of a minor, criminal child abuse, assault with a deadly weapon,
and as the case against Ms. Gibbs demonstrates, women have also been prosecuted
for manslaughter and murder.140 Like in the civil law context, criminal law
prosecutions have depended upon the construction of the fetus as a legal person, thus
a proper target of the state’s protection.141 And like in the civil law context, race

compared to 10.7% of Black women tested, were reported to county welfare authorities. Id. at
1203–04.
137

See supra section I.

138

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (West 2014). The statute is extensive and encompassing
on many fronts. For example in its definition of “person” includes “a human embryo or fetus
at any stage of gestation in utero, when any such term refers to the victim of any act made
criminal by this part.” § 39-13-107 (a) And although it precludes the prosecution of women
for any “lawful act or lawful omission” during pregnancy, including any lawful medical or
surgical procedure . . . performed by a health care professional.” § 39-13-107 (c) (1), the
statute explicitly permits the prosecution of women who use drugs while pregnant. The statute
reads:
Notwithstanding subdivision (c) (1), nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution
of a woman for assault under § 39-13-101 for the illegal use of a narcotic drug, as
defined in § 39-17-402, while pregnant, if her child is born addicted to or harmed by
the narcotic drug and the addiction or harm is a result of her illegal use of a narcotic
drug taken while pregnant.
§ 39-13-107 (c) (2). See also Sydney Lupkin, Why Some Doctors Object to Tennessee Law
that Criminalizes Drug Use During Pregnancy: Experts Weigh In on Law that Led to New
Mom’s Arrest, ABC NEWS, July 14, 2014; CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING
WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY 2 (2013), http://reproductiverights.org/
sites/default/files/documents/pub_bp_punishingwomen.pdf. Last accessed Sept. 25, 2014.
139

GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 61.

140

See supra, section I.B.; see also, Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (S.C. 1997)
(upholding conviction for criminal child neglect after birth of newborn testing positive for
cocaine metabolites); Johnson v. Florida, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1297 (Fl.1992) (overturning
conviction for delivery of controlled substance through the umbilical cord); State v.
McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 179 (S.C. 2003) (affirming twenty-year sentence for felony
murder based on child endangerment), vacated, 661 S.E.2d 354 (2008) (overturning
conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Dailard & Nash, supra
note 79, 4–5; PALTROW, COHEN & CAREY, supra 131.
141

The Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 (also known as Laci and Connor’s Law)
is an example of the construction of the fetus as a legal person. The statute provides that one
who injures or kills “an unborn child” is guilty of an offense that is separate from the crime
committed against the pregnant woman; § 1841(d) defines the term “unborn child” to mean
“‘a child in utero’ and the term ‘child in utero’ or ‘child, who is in utero’ means a member of
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plays a part in these prosecutions as women of color are more likely to be held
criminally liable for any alleged harm to their fetuses.142 As a result, fetal protection
and the moral values of fetal personhood have not only become integral parts of the
law, but they also contribute to the disproportionate characterization of women of
color as bad mothers. Feticide statutes exacerbate this disproportionate treatment by
the creation of a new crime of fetal homicide and the recognition of the fetus qua
fetus as a proper entity for the protection of the criminal law.
In the remainder of this section, I outline the varied ways that the criminal law
has viewed the killing of a fetus, including the prosecution of pregnant and postpartum women for self-harming activities that result in fetal death. Examination of
the common law, the federal law, and state statutes also demonstrate the
development of a criminal law paradigm that punishes women without any
corresponding benefit to fetuses and infants.143
1.

The Common Law: Born Alive Rule

The crime of feticide, or fetal homicide, was unknown at common law.144
Because the fetus was not deemed to be a legal person, it could not be murdered.145
This does not mean that the common law did not punish the destruction of any and
all fetuses.146 The destruction of a “quick” fetus147 was sometimes deemed a
misdemeanor.148 The injury of a fetus in utero was only actionable as murder if the

the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.” 18
U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2014) (Pub. L. No. 108–212—Apr. 1, 2004) (§1841 (a)(1).
142 Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 36, at 310–11; see also id, at 322. (finding that 52% of
arrests and interventions were of Black women; 41% of the women were white); Roberts,
Motherhood and Crime, supra note 9, at 97–98; Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note
9, at 1424.
143

See, e.g., supra section I (providing discussion & analysis of three cases).

144 Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884) (establishing that a
fetus has “no separate existence” from the pregnant woman and therefore cannot seek
damages for injuries sustained in utero).
145 For example, during the sixteenth century, the common view held if a man killed a fetus
in utero, it was neither actionable at law nor subject him to forfeiture of any rights because
“the thing killed had no baptismal name.” Jennifer A. Brobst, The Prospect of Enacting an
Unborn Victims of Violence Act in North Carolina, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 127, 133 (2006).
However, in some instances the viable fetus was recognized as having an interest in tort law,
in wrongful death actions. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
146 See Michael P. McCready, Recovery for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus, 25 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 391, 391–92 (1995).
147 “Quickening” refers to the moment in a pregnancy when the pregnant woman feels, for
the first time, the movement of her baby in utero. It usually occurring between 16 and 20
weeks of gestation. MOSBY'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 8th ed. (2009). Thus a “quick fetus’
refers to a fetus that has reached this point of development.
148 In certain criminal cases, there was potential for recovery for the wrongful death of a
fetus if that fetus were born alive. The same was not true for tort cases. Id.
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fetus was born alive but then died of injuries sustained in utero.149 This policy is
expressed by the “born alive” rule.
The “born alive” rule provided criminal penalties for infant death resulting from
harm in utero where the infant was (1) ultimately born alive, (2) had injuries inflicted
upon it by another person, and (3) died as a result of the injuries inflicted.150 The
difficulty of the rule lay in knowing whether or not the fetus was actually alive when
the accused was alleged to have caused the fetal death.151 The common law born
alive approach is a “single entity approach,” an approach that treats the fetus and the
pregnant woman as a single entity, and thus holds that a person cannot be charged
with the murder of an entity that is not legally alive.152
The common law view prevailed in the United States and was accepted by every
court that considered the issue of whether or not the killing of a fetus should be
deemed murder; that is until 1984 when the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the
case Commonwealth v. Cass, held that modern medical knowledge undermined the
primary rationale in support of the born alive rule.153 The court noted: “Medical
science now may provide competent proof as to whether the fetus was alive at the
time of a defendant’s conduct and whether his conduct was the cause of death.”154
Thus the court held that third-party violence against a pregnant woman that
destroyed her viable fetus was punishable as a homicide.155
Since the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling in Cass, there has been a
tremendous decline in courts acceptance and use of the born alive rule.156 As of
February 2013, at least 38 states have fetal homicide laws,157 and in twenty-three of
149

Id. at 391.

150

See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 139 (D.D.C. 1946); see also Tara Kole & Laura
Kadetsky, Recent Development: The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
215, 216 (2002).
151

Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (1984).

152

See e.g., Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884).

153

Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (1984).

154

Id.

155 Id. at 1329. A footnote, citing to the U.S. Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence,
suggests that the Massachusetts court limited fetal homicide to the killing of viable fetuses in
order not to conflict with constitutional protections for abortion. See 467 N.E.2d at 1329 n.11.
156 Other courts rejecting the born alive rule include: Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d
619, 628 (1970) (rejecting the born alive rule and protecting a fetus under the California
murder statute); State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984); Hughes v. State, 868 P. 2d
730, 735 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); State ex.rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482,
484 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
157 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures. Fetal Homicide Laws (Updated Feb. 2013)
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx (Accessed on Mar. 4,
2014). ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.150 (2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1102 (2009) (West); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13) (B)(i)(a)-(b) (2009)
(LexisNexis); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3401(13) (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80
(West 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (West 2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1.2
(West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-2-1.5 (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8 (West
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these jurisdictions the fetal homicide laws apply to embryos and fetuses in the
earliest stages of pregnancy.158 Some states define homicide as the killing of an
embryo or fetus in “any state of gestation,” including “conception,” “fertilization,”
and “post-fertilization.” 159 Other state legislatures have created a new crime of fetal
homicide.160
2. The Federal Law: The Unborn Victims of Violence Act
In 2004, Congress passed the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. 161 This statute
was the first federal statute imposing a separate criminal penalty for causing the
death or injury of a fetus at any stage of development.162 It provides that one who
injures or kills a fetus during the commission of certain enumerated federal crimes is
guilty of an offense that is separate from the crime committed against the pregnant
woman.163 Moreover, the federal statute explicitly provides that the killing or
injuring of a fetus (both viable and nonviable) is subject to the same punishment as

2009); KY. REV. STAT. § 507A.010 (West 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5 (2009); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 208-C (2009); MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Law § 2-103 (West 2009);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.323 (West 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.205 (West 2009);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-388 (West 2009); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200.210 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-17.1-01 (West 2009); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 691 (West 2009); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2603 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-5 (West 2009); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1083 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-41 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-13-214 (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.232.2 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
61-2-30 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04(2) (West 2009).
158

Feticide statutes punishing feticide at all stages include: Alabama, Arizona, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Id.
159

Id (Examples include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Florida, and
Kansas).
160 Id (Examples include Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, and
Louisiana).
161 Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1841, and 10 U.S.C. §919a (2012)) (also known as Laci and
Connor’s Law). The statute amends both the United States Code and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.
162 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(d) (defining “unborn child” as “a member of the species homo
sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb”).
163

The Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2014) (Pub. L.
No. 108–212—Apr. 1, 2004) (§ 1841 (a)(1) provides that one who injures or kills “an unborn
child” is guilty of an offense that is separate from the crime committed against the pregnant
woman; § 1841(d) defines the term “unborn child” to mean “‘a child in utero’ and the term
‘child in utero’ or ‘child, who is in utero’ means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any
stage of development, who is carried in the womb.”).
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would be the case if that injury or death had occurred to the fetus’s mother.164 As
legal scholar Deborah Tuerkheimer notes, the statute:
does not create any new crimes or enhanced sentences with respect to
pregnant victims of violence, nor does it recognize that the harm of
violence may be distinct when experienced by a woman during
pregnancy. Rather, the (Unborn Victims of Violence Act) supplements
existing law only insofar as it makes fetuses a new class of crime
victims.165
Curiously, in portions of the statute, the pregnant woman is largely absent from
view. For instance, at one point in the statue the pregnant woman upon whom the
violence is initiated is referred to as “the unborn child’s mother.”166 The woman is
“disappeared” by, or made invisible by, the language of the statute.167 This erasure is
irrational, because it could hardly be said that violence that affects the fetus does not
affect or harm the pregnant woman.
Despite the erasure of the pregnant woman in portions of the statute, the pregnant
woman’s behavior is exempted from sanction under the federal statute, which states
164 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (2) (A) (West 2014) (“Except as otherwise provided in this
paragraph, the punishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment provided
under Federal law for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the unborn child’s
mother.”).
165 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 IND. L.J.
667, 696 (2006).
166

Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1841, and 10 U.S.C. §919a (2012)).
167 I wonder if this is, at least in part, a function of technology. Ultrasounds, often
performed during pregnancy, give the physician and the pregnant women a view of the fetus
that is in many ways false. On the computer monitor and on the photo offered to the pregnant
woman, the fetus is unconnected to its mother – it is free-floating. Thus the fetus can be
visually seen as a singular entity – an autonomous being that can then be imbued with both
legal and moral rights. It can then more easily be seem as a being in need of an advocate to
protect it from a potential enemy. From the vantage point of the technology, the fetus can be
imagined to be a separate person and a separate patient. I surmise that all of this talk of fetal
personhood and the fetus as a separate person becomes possible because the technology, by
allowing us a peek inside pregnant women’s bodies, the technology has allowed our cultural
imagination to perceive separateness where many women experience unity. See, e.g., Patricia
Williams, Fetal Fictions: An Exploration of Property Archetypes in Racial and Gendered
Contexts, 42 FLA. L. REV. 81, 92 (1990) (discussing pregnancy as a unitary experience rather
than an experience where the woman and fetus are separate beings); Carole Stabile, Shooting
the Mother: Fetal Photography and the Politics of Disappearance, 28 CAMERA OBSCURA 179,
179–85 (1992); Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the
Politics of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263 (1987) (ability to see the fetus in utero
through the use of ultrasound technology has promoted the view of the fetus as a separate
individual, and as a separate patient); see also Susan Marken, Feeding the Fetus: On
Interrogating the Notion of Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 23 FEMINIST STUD. 351 (1997) (arguing
that emergence of fetal rights discourse is not solely attributable to technological innovation; it
is also a result of anti-abortion rhetoric); LISA M. MITCHELL, BABY’S FIRST PICTURE:
ULTRASOUND & THE POLITICS OF FETAL SUBJECTS (2001); JANELLE S. TAYLOR, THE PUBLIC
LIFE OF THE FETAL SONOGRAM: TECHNOLOGY, CONSUMPTION & THE POLITICS OF
REPRODUCTION (2008).
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“[n]othing in [this statute] shall be construed to permit the prosecution . . . of any
woman with respect to her unborn child.”168 In this way the federal statute can be
understood as protecting the pregnant woman’s interest in her fetus, and providing
added protection to pregnant women from the harms of third parties. 169 Even so, the
federal statute has caused concern among those who advocate on behalf of women
because it is premised on the idea of fetal rights and similar statutes at the state level
have been used to prosecute pregnant women for prenatal harms.170 These women’s
rights advocates are thus concerned that the federal statute will be used to punish
pregnant women “for behaviors and conditions that are not criminally sanctioned for
other members of society.”171
Due to some of these concerns, in 2003, Senator Diane Feinstein and
Representative Zoe Lofgren introduced the Motherhood Protection Act.172 Their
proposed statute would have enhanced the penalties for certain violent crimes against
pregnant women when those crimes resulted in “an interruption in the normal course
of their pregnancies.”173 Instead of focusing on the fetus, this proposed statute
focused on the harm to pregnant women and pregnant women’s interest in their
fetuses that are the result of third-party violence.174 The Motherhood Protection Act
was not enacted, but the Unborn Victims of Violence Act became law. Implicit in
these Congressional actions is that Congress prefers to focus on fetal life as an
independent interest rather than focus on the lives of pregnant women and interests
of pregnant women in the lives of their fetuses.
3. State Feticide Statutes –Where the Action Is
As noted earlier, the addition of the fetus as a potential victim in traditional
homicide statutes, as well as the creation of new fetal homicide statutes represent a
fairly new political and legislative strategy. Nevertheless, as of February of 2013, at
least 38 states have fetal homicide laws.175 Like the federal statute, these state
168

18 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (3). Pregnant women are exempted from prosecution in at least 18
state statutes as well. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 157.
169

Crist, supra note 114, at 858.

170

The National Advocates for Pregnant Women issued a statement which reads:

The Unborn Victims of Violence Act creates a federal law making it a crime to cause
harm to a “child in utero,” recognizing everything from a zygote to a fetus as an
independent “victim,” with legal rights distinct from the woman who has been
attacked. More than 30 states already have similar laws on the books. In practice,
these laws treat the pregnant woman as little more than collateral damage in an attack
portrayed to the public as one directed against the fetus. Moreover, pregnant women
in states with such laws are more likely to be punished for behaviors and conditions
that are not criminally sanctioned for other members of society.
National Advocates for Pregnant Women, available at http://advocatesfor
pregnantwomen.org/issues/unborn_victims_of_violence_act.php.
171

Id.

172

The Motherhood Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. §1 (2003).

173

Id.

174

Id.

175

Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra 157.
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statutes primarily target fetal harm, by constructing and delineating the fetus as the
victim,176 and many explicitly exempt pregnant women from prosecution.177
Twenty-three of these jurisdictions, however, apply their fetal homicide laws to
embryos and fetuses in the earliest stages of pregnancy.178
Although these statutes’ coverage of both viable and nonviable fetuses may seem
inconsistent with constitutional law, given that the Constitution protects women’s
right to abortion until viability,179 the inclusion of nonviable fetuses for protection
nevertheless can make sense if the fact that “abortion is . . . legal indicates that in this
area of the law, the interests, choices, and wishes of pregnant women are the
overriding concern, rather than any attempt at a consistent definition of ‘when life
begins.”180 This means that while state feticide statutes could be understood as
protecting the interests of pregnant women in the lives of their fetuses instead of
protecting the fetus qua fetus, often they are not. The difficulty is that prosecutors do
not always understand feticide statutes as protecting the interest of pregnant women.
Because many of the feticide statutes do not explicitly preclude the operation of the
statues when the behavior of the pregnant woman has caused the death of the fetus,
many prosecutors construe feticide statutes as requiring the punishment of pregnant
women for prenatal behavior that is deleterious to the fetus. In fact, only twelve of
the thirty-eight states with fetal homicide laws explicitly preclude the punishment of
abortion under the state fetal homicide laws.181
In practice, these statutes do little to protect the fetus or pregnant women from
harm done by third parties. Nor do these statutes vindicate any interest that the
pregnant woman might have in the life of her fetus. Instead, what these statutes do is
grant rights to the fetus, create an adversarial relationship between the fetus and the
pregnant woman, and criminalize the behavior of the pregnant woman when that
behavior is believed to result in miscarriages, stillbirths, or other fetal harm.182

176

See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 157.

177

Id.

178

Feticide statutes punishing feticide at all stages include: Alabama, Arizona, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Id.
179 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (permitting state regulations so long as regulation does not
have as “its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion before the fetus attains viability”).
180 Benjamin Wolf, New York’s Fetal Homicide Law & Legal Abortion – The Common
Denominator, ELIOT SCHLISSEL N.Y. L. BLOG (Apr. 20, 2009), http://schissellaw.wordpress.
com/2009/04/20/new-yok-will-soon-classify-killing-a-fetus-at -any-stage-of-gestation-ashomicide/.
181 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note
157.
182 Another problem here is that while the statutes nominally protect the fetus from the
harm of third parties – they miss the bigger point – the protection of women from the harm of
third parties, particularly, domestic violence.
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Deborah Tuerkheimer makes a similar argument in the context of domestic violence
against pregnant women. She states:
By granting fetuses victim status, the (Unborn Victim of Violence) and
similar state laws sever the interests of fetus and pregnant woman,
ultimately furthering an agenda of control over women’s bodies and lives.
Redefining the fetus as a victim – to the exclusion of the pregnant woman
– the law obscures the injury that has been inflicted on the woman. It does
so in a manner that, by removing her from consideration altogether,
effectively precludes an account of the nature of her suffering, or even her
existence as a person who has been harmed.183
The same can be said in the context of maternal self-harm. When feticide statutes
are used to prosecute pregnant women for self-harming behaviors that also harm
their fetuses, the law acts in such a way as to obscure the injuries and suffering of
pregnant women. The lives of pregnant women become secondary to the life of the
fetus. Moreover, the fetal protection narrative works to enforce gender norms via the
law, by punishing women who do not comply with the state’s construction of the
“good” mother. The purported state interest in the fetus seems to preclude actions by
the state in support of these pregnant women.
IV. THE IDEOLOGY OF MOTHERHOOD, MATERNAL DEVIANCE DISCOURSES AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF THE BAD MOTHER
Motherhood is a hegemonic ideology. An ideology is a network of ideas and
images that endeavor to explain or justify the status quo; and as such, ideology
reflects the preferences of, and operates to serve the interests of, a particular
group.184 A hegemonic ideology, then, is one that reflects the biases of and serves to
protect the advantages had by the dominant political or cultural group.185 Ideology
enables dominant groups to justify their control over subordinated groups, “often by
making existing order seem inevitable.”186 When considered in these terms, it
becomes clear that motherhood is not simply a biological status. Motherhood is an
ideology, and in American culture it is one that has been shaped by prevailing
patriarchal norms.187 As a hegemonic ideology, motherhood is reinforced by at least
183

Tuerkheimer, supra note 165, at 696–97.

184

JOHN T. JOST, AARON C. KAY & HILDA THORISDOTTIR, SOCIAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES
OF IDEOLOGY & SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION 4-5 (2009) (defining the concept of ideology).
185 JOHN STOREY, CULTURE & POWER IN CULTURAL STUDIES: THE POLITICS OF
SIGNIFICATION 6-7 (2010) (discussing the concept of hegemony).
186

Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Social Construction of Mothering: A Thematic Overview, in
MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 1–29 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Grace
Change & Linda Rennie Forcey eds., 1994).
187 Institutions support hegemonic ideologies and motherhood can also be understood as an
institution. Emile Durkheim defined a social institution as follows:

An institution is any structure or mechanism of social order governing the behavior of
a set of individuals within a given community; may it be human or a specific animal
one. Institutions are identified with a social purpose, transcending individuals and
intentions by mediating the rules that govern living behavior.
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three core beliefs and expectations: (1) that motherhood for women is normal,
natural, and desired; (2) that good mothers are altruistic and intensive, which
includes the assumption of primary responsibility for the care of their children; and
(3) that the women who put their own needs and desires before those of their
children are bad mothers who need to be regulated and controlled.188 Thus maternal
altruism is an essential characteristic of the “good” mother.189 Indeed, altruism is
often viewed as women’s defining moral characteristic.190 In social discourses on
motherhood, altruism is an essential characteristic of women, and motherhood is
their essential purpose.191 As mothers, women are expected to be completely selfsacrificing and selfless. The aforementioned cases demonstrate that when pregnant
See generally Émile DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD, 45 (George E. G.
Catlin ed., Sarah A. Solovay & John M. Mueller trans., 8th ed., 1938, 1964). Adrienne Rich is
one social commentator that discusses motherhood as a hegemonic institution. See generally
ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION (1976).
188 See ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 9, at 8–21 (detailing how Black
women are deemed bad mothers in need of social control).
189

See JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS 9 (1993). As sociologist Janice Raymond

notes:
For women, gift-giving is a source of identity, status, and relieffrom guilt. Women
who don’t give time, energy, care, sex . . . are exposed to disapproval or penalty. But
the more importantelement here is that on a cultural level women are expected
todonate themselves in the form of time, energy and body, particularly mothers.
Id.
190 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENCE VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT 24–63, 159–60 (1982); see also NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 178 (1978) (describing

“[w]oman’s roles [as] basically familial, and concerned with personal, affective ties.”);
ROSALIND PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN’S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 328 (1994) (explaining the modern definition of motherhood as a
“total and selfless devotion to one’s biological children”); PATRICE DIQUINZIO, THE
IMPOSSIBILITY OF MOTHERHOOD: FEMINISM, INDIVIDUALISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF MOTHERING
xiii (1999) (examining the conflicted relationship of feminism and individualism).
For example, according to psychologist Carol Gilligan, the socialization of women and
girls focuses on their relationships with others, exercising care and concern for others, and
nurturing others. GILLIGAN, supra note 190; see also Nel Noddings, Ethics from the
Standpoint of Women, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 160 (Deborah
L. Rhode ed., 1990) (defending the construction of female ethics based on women’s
traditional role as nurturer).
191 See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 238 (1979) (citing
psychologist Bruno Bettelheim who asserted that women “‘want first and foremost . . . to be
mothers.’”). These social norms regarding who women are, and their proper role, have been
enforced throughout our nation’s history by the power of law. The constitutionality of the
denial of women’s admission to the bar, and of protective labor legislation for women has
been predicated on these social roles and enforced by law. The law has enforced these state
sanctioned roles even in the face of one of the primary obligations of citizenship: jury service.
Women were initially excluded from jury service and then excused from such service on
account of these social norms regarding the altruistic mother. See, Cherry, Roe’s Legacy,
supra note 3, at 740–44.
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women violate these social norms they are often subject to criminal sanction.192 For
those who advance the notion of the propriety of the criminal law in these
circumstances, the use of criminal sanctions make sense – one purpose of the
criminal law is to safeguard social norms, not to examine them.193
A. Motherhood as the Normal, Natural, and Desired Status of Women
A core attribute of the hegemonic ideology of motherhood is that women
naturally desire to be mothers.194 Sociologist Evelyn Nakano Glenn suggests that
motherhood may be seen as a normal and expected role for women because it
appears unavoidable, a status springing from women’s reproductive capacity.195
These ideas receive support from others in the culture, including scientists,
psychologists, and psychoanalysts, who argue that women are called to mother and
must do so in order to lead healthy and fulfilling lives.196 Motherhood is viewed not
just as natural and instinctive, but as required – consider, for instance, the “maternal
instinct.” The notion that women have, or should have, a “maternal instinct”
reinforces the belief that all women should be and desire to be mothers.197 Thus “by
depicting motherhood as natural, a patriarchal ideology of mothering locks women
into biological reproduction and denies them identities and selfhood outside of
mothering.”198 Moreover, not to mother is evidence of failure, or worse, deviance.199
As Sociologist Martha Gimenez states:
To be childless becomes synonymous with failure, and those feelings are
reinforced by cultural and social pressures which condemn childlessness.
The equation of motherhood with self-realization, in conjunction with the
lack of desirable [or socially acceptable] alternatives . . . make women's
192

Supra section I; see also Cherry, Roe’s Legacy, supra note 3, at 740.

193

Thanks to my colleague Patricia J. Falk for this observation.

194

Glenn, supra note 186, at 3.

195

Id.

196 RICH, supra note 187, at 265–66; see also ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE
PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS AND PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 129 (1995); Benjamin
Spock, Should Mothers Work? LADIES’ HOME J., Feb. 1963, quoted in Sandra L. Bern & Daryl
J. Bem, Homogenizing the American Woman: The Power of an Unconscious Ideology, in
FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
WOMEN AND MEN, 10 (Alison Jaggar & Paula Rothenberg eds., 1978).
197 ANN OAKLEY, WOMAN’S WORK: THE HOUSEWIFE, PAST AND PRESENT 186 (1974); J.
SWIGART, THE MYTH OF THE BAD MOTHER: THE EMOTIONAL REALITIES OF MOTHERING 8
(1991).
198

Glenn, supra note 186, at 9.

199

Martha E. Gimenez, Feminism, Pronatalism, and Motherhood, in MOTHERING: ESSAYS
287–90, 297 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983) (agreeing with the arguments
developed by sociologist Judith Blake). As a corollary, motherhood is often understood as a
prerequisite for women’s adult status. It is viewed as an indicia of adult status, and a condition
for all socially acceptable female adult roles. See also Maya Angelou, Forward, to DOUBLE
STITCH: BLACK WOMEN WRITE ABOUT MOTHERS AND DAUGHTERS, xi-xii (Patricia Bell-Scott,
et al., eds 1991); B. WEARING, THE IDEOLOGY OF MOTHERHOOD: A STUDY OF SYDNEY
SUBURBAN MOTHERS 72 (1984).
IN FEMINIST THEORY
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attainment of reproductive freedom structurally impossible. "Selfdetermination cannot exist if none of the options is attractive."200
Naturalizing motherhood is a way of essentializing motherhood. Because
“mother” is an abstract sort of character, individual women, the contexts of their
lives, and the contexts in which they actually mother become immaterial. Women as
mothers tend to be divided into two groups: the good, altruistic mother, or the bad,
selfish mother whose care and concern is not for her children, but only for herself.201
B. “Intensive Mothering”: Good Mothering is Altruistic and All-Consuming
A second attribute of the hegemonic ideology of motherhood is that good
mothers are altruistic, and that good mothering practice is intensive.202 Although
intensive mothering practices began with the advent of the industrial revolution, 203 it
was not until the 1960s that “child development researchers ‘discovered’ maternal
bonding” as necessary to the proper development of infants and children.204 The idea
of maternal bonding “was used to argue that the infant need a single caretaking
figure, preferably the biological mother, to develop a healthy sense of self and the
ability to relate to others.”205 It was argued that in order for children to thrive,
mothers need to be physically available at home.206 Women who worked outside of
the home could be seen as deviant, shirking their maternal duties to the detriment of
their children.207 In fact, contemporary proponents of this ideology assert that “less
200 Gimenez, supra note 199, at 297 (quoting LINDA GORDON, WOMAN’S BODY, WOMAN’S
RIGHT 408 (1976)).
201

Id.

202

Id.

203 See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, WOMEN HAVE ALWAYS WORKED: AN HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW 33–35 (1981). With the nineteenth century industrial revolution came the idealized
form of motherhood under the auspices of the cult of domesticity. The role of women ascribed
to women was that of the stay at home mother whose primary duty was to birth, rear, and
mold her children. Id. By the turn of the twentieth century this ideal was well cemented. Id.
204

Glenn, supra note 186, at 9–10.

205

Id.

206

Id.

207

Self-sacrifice is not just a virtue for mothers, it is a condition of good motherhood. The
importance of women’s physical availability can be seen in the present day hegemonic
ideology of motherhood which preferences practices sociologist Sharon Hays has labeled
“intensive mothering.” See SHARON HAYS, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD
4 (1998). According to Hays, intensive mothering is not just a practice, it is an ideology that
obliges that each individual mother to be primarily responsible for raising her children. It
requires child rearing be “child-centered” and directed by “experts.” And finally, it requires
that child rearing be time consuming, emotionally absorbing, and expensive. Id. at 69. Hays
notes that under intensive mothering ideology, mothers are responsible for the health and
character of their children from conception through adulthood. Id. at 108. In order to meet
these responsibilities, the good mother must be self-sacrificing. Indeed, in intensive mothering
discourse, the good mother “is not subject to her own needs and interests” D. Bassin, M.
Honey, & M.M. Kaplan. Introduction, in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 2 (D. Bassin, M.
Honey, & M.M. Kaplan, eds., 1994). “Attachment parenting” is one version of how intensive
parenting is performed. A 2012 Time Magazine article on attachment parenthood noted:
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sensitive and emotionally unavailable parenting” is akin to neglecting the child's
needs and may result in mental health problems in children, including depression,
anxiety, and eating disorders.208 Good mothering then, requires maternal altruism. It
requires mothers to be physically available to their children in all circumstances; it
requires maternal sacrifice.209
Maternal altruism is not simply an expectation. It is reified and enforced by
prevailing social and legal norms. Under this ideology, pregnant women who engage
in self-harming behaviors that result in, or have the potential to result in, fetal harm
are viewed as selfish and not selfless in complete opposition to the prototypical
“good” mother. One way that this component of the hegemonic motherhood
ideology, and hence, control of women’s reproductive and maternal behavior, is
enforced by shaming.210 The cultural myth is that if women wanted to be “good
While the concept sounds simple, the practicalities of attachment parenting ask a great
deal of mothers. The three basic tenets are breast-feeding (sometimes into
toddlerhood), co-sleeping (inviting babies into the parental bed or pulling a bassinet
alongside it) and “baby wearing,” in which infants are literally attached to their
mothers via slings. Attachment-parenting dogma also says that every baby’s whimper
is a plea for help and that no infant should ever be left to cry.
Kate Pickert, The Man Who Remade Motherhood, TIME MAG. May 21, 2012.
208

Pickert, supra note 207.

209 Part of maternal altruism is the willingness of a pregnant woman to sacrifice her life for
the life or health of her fetus. The strict anti-abortion policies of Catholic hospitals to refuse
abortion or referral for abortion even where the pregnant woman’s life is at risk, is an example
of the requirement of maternal altruism in practice. See U.S. Conf. of Bishops, Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services 26 (5th ed. 2009) available at
www.usccb.org.

Many physicians believe that by not permitting abortions or abortion referral, these
hospitals are neglecting their pregnant patients, constituting medical malpractice. See Erik
Eckholm, Bishops Sued Over Anti-Abortion Policies at Catholic Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/03/us/lawsuit-challenges-antiabortion-policies-at-catholic-hospitals.html?_r=0; Molly M. Ginty, Treatment Denied, MS.
MAGAZINE, Spring 2011, available at http://www.msmagazine.com/spring2011/
treatmentdenied.asp (discussing near death incidents of pregnant women at Catholic
hospitals); PETCHESKY, supra note 190, at 328 (explaining that modern definition of
motherhood entails “total and selfless devotion to one’s biological children.”). Post mortem
obstetrical intervention is another example. See JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS 47,
52 (1993) (discussing post-mortem obstetrical interventions).
210 See Miriam Liss, et al., Maternal Guilt and Shame: The Role of Self-discrepancy and
Fear of Negative Evaluation, 22 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 1112, 1116 (2012) (“Mothers who
internalize the cultural standards of motherhood (Rizzo et al. 2012), as well as experience
shame about their inability to meet those standards. . . . may be particularly prone to
depression.”) (citations omitted). The article further explains:

Theorists and researchers have expressed concerns over the high standards for being a
perfect mother that have become the dominant discourse for motherhood. . . . Our data
suggest that the internalization of these high standards for ideal motherhood and the
perception that one does not meet these standards is detrimental to mothers of young
children. Internalization of the motherhood myth has been implicated as a source of
guilt for mothers . . . and our data confirm this idea and expand it to the feeling of
shame. Furthermore, fear of being judged by others exacerbates the impact of feeling
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mothers” they could be, if only they made better choices. Concepts like autonomy
and choice are used to construct the myth that pregnant women have the power to
overcome mental illness, addiction, and despair, without resources and without
treatment.211 The problem is that such a mythos ignores the context in which women
mother; it disregards the ways in which social and economic conditions affect
behavior and possibilities. Women who deviate from the dictates of hegemonic
motherhood, those who make “bad” choices, are constructed as bad mothers and
subject to both social regulation through shaming and through legal regulation
through fetal rights’ mechanisms.212
C. Deviancy Discourses: Maternal Deviance and the Pregnant Woman
Pregnant women whose behavior does, or has the potential to, negatively affect
their fetuses are often characterized as deviant,213 and deviant mothers are treated
with derision and potentially subject to legal repercussions. Historians Molly LaddTaylor and Lauri Umansky have argued that for at least 100 years, “bad” mothers
have been categorized in one of three ways: (1) those who mother outside of the
“traditional” nuclear family; (2) those who could not protect their children from
harm, including harms caused by third parties or by disease; and (3) those who did
not mother well – those whose children grew up to be disreputable adults.214 As
Ladd-Taylor and Umansky note:

that one is not living up to the internalized societal standards of motherhood. Women
who have more realistic expectations for what it means to be a good mother may be
protected from the potential detrimental effects of guilt and shame. Therefore,
adjusting both societal and individual expectations for the standards of motherhood
might benefit women’s mental health.
Id. at 1117 (citations omitted).
211

See Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration, supra note 2; Cherry,
Roe’s Legacy, supra note 3; DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE (2002) [hereinafter ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS].
212 Ann Phoenix & Anne Woollett, Motherhood: Social Construction, Politics and
Psychology, MOTHERHOOD: MEANINGS, PRACTICES AND IDEOLOGIES 13, 18–19 (Ann Phoenix,
Anne Woollett & Eva Lloyd., eds., 1991). The hegemonic ideology of motherhood is also
used to limit women’s participation in the labor market on equal terms with men and to
devalue both women’s paid labor and women’s affective labor in the home. See Natalie J.
Sokoloff, Motherwork and Working Mothers, FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE
THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 259–66 (Alison M.
Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg, eds.,1984); Paula England, Gender Inequality in Labor
Markets: The Role of Motherhood and Segregation, 12 SOC. POL. 264, 278–80 (2005); Arlene
Kaplan Daniels, Invisible Work, 34 SOC. PROBS. 403, 405–06 (1987).
213 MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR & LAURI UMANSKY, “BAD” MOTHERS: THE POLITICS OF BLAME IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA. 3–4 (1998). Sociologists understand deviance as behavior
that is disapproved of by the larger culture, and as such, is socially constructed. Whether
behavior is approved or disapproved – that is whether any behavior is deviant – depends on
who is behaving and who is defining the behavior. Thus, deviance must be understood as
behavior that is located in a social context.
214

Id.
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Women who did not fit the middle-class family ideal of breadwinning
father and stay-at-home mother have born (sic) the brunt of motherblaming throughout most of American history. Wage-earning mothers,
single mothers, slave mothers – in short, everyone except middle-class
whites – fall outside the narrow good-mother ideal.215
Pregnant women who engage in behavior that may, or is believed to, negatively
affect their fetuses, often fall into all three of Ladd-Taylor and Umansky “bad”
mother classifications. They are often single, poor, and uneducated and participate in
behaviors thought to produce sub-standard children.216 Moreover, female gender
norms are heightened with regard to pregnant women.217 Pregnant women are
expected to be all-sacrificing toward their fetuses.218 Not only are they are expected
to give up their lives for their fetuses, they are expected, after death, to continue their
sacrifice. Pregnancy exceptions in living will statutes, which make void the living
will of pregnant women, are illustrative of this expectation.219 Perhaps these statutes

215 Id. Black mothers have long been held as deviant and dangerous. Dangerous to their
own children and dangerous to the culture at large – that is social problems in the Black
community, as well as in the larger culture have been blamed on Black mothers.
Contemporary stereotypes about Black women as mothers has reinforced the view that Black
families are dysfunctional; and that they are so on account of the Black mother who is
describing as domineering and lacking maternal instincts. See, e.g., DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN,
OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR. THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE
CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 29–34 (1965). Under this discourse, Black children are viewed in
either one of two ways. At times black children are viewed as victims of Black mothers – they
are viewed as not receiving any benefit from the care of Black mothers, or as being harmed by
it. Indeed, African-American mothers have been found guilty of both neglecting their children
and disciplining too harshly, ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 211, at 32–34, and
emasculating their sons and defeminizing their daughters. MOYNIHAN, supra note 215, at 29–
34.
216 Pamela J. Smith has noted that in American culture, as a result of racism, “Black
children are more likely to be deemed mentally retarded, more likely to be deemed seriously
emotionally disturbed, more likely to be deemed to have a specific learning disability, and are
more likely to be educationally tracked into lower ability groups.” Our Children's Burden:
The Many-Headed Hydra of the Educational Disenfranchisement of Black Children, 42 HOW.
L.J., 133, 190 (1998). Smith also notes that the majority of “the tests used to assess whether a
child has a disability, are subject to abuse and racial bias.” Id. (citing Peter Breggin & Ginger
Ross Breggin, THE WAR ON CHILDREN 77, 170–71 (1993)). See also GOMEZ, supra note 49.
217

LADD-TAYLOR & UMANSKY, supra note 213, at 3–4.

218

Id.

219

Several jurisdictions have living will statutes that make the living will of a pregnant
woman void. For example Ohio’s pregnancy exception is contained in R.C. § 2133.06(B)
which provides:
Life-sustaining treatment shall not be withheld or withdrawn from a declarant
pursuant to a declaration if the declarant is pregnant and if the withholding or
withdrawal of life support would terminate the pregnancy, unless the declarant’s
attending physician and one other physician who has examined the declarant
determine, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and accordance with reasonable
medical standards, that the fetus would not be born alive.
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serve as proof that as a culture, we do not value women for their own sake.220 Rather,
we value women only to the extent that they serve the needs of others.221
Women who are deemed deviant mothers “plac[e] [themselves] outside of female
nature and culture”222 and risk placing themselves outside of the law’s protection as
the force of law continues to be used to ensure women’s compliance with female
social norms.223 It is only when pregnant women make altruistic “choices” on behalf
of their fetuses, often notwithstanding social and economic forces, that these choices
and women’s liberty are certain to be protected by the state.224 In the alternative,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06(B) (West 2014). See also Katherine Taylor, The Pregnancy
Exclusions: Respect for Women Requires Repeal, 14 AMER. J. OF BIOETHICS 50 (2014);
Katherine Taylor, Compelling Pregnancy at Death’s Door, 7 COLUM. J. OF GENDER & L. 85
(1997); Megan Greene & Leslie Wolfe, Pregnancy Exclusion in State Living Will and Medical
Proxy Statutes (2012), available at http://www.centerwomenpolicy.org/programs/
health/statepolicy/default.asp.
A November 2013 case in Texas is instructive. Marlise Munoz was declared brain dead.
At the time she was 14 weeks pregnant (and hence the fetus was not yet viable) and had
previously expressed her desire to have ventilation removed in the case brain death. Id. The
Texas statute, however, prohibited removal of “life sustaining” treatment from pregnant
women on the fetal protection grounds. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West
2014) (“A person may not withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment under this
subchapter from a pregnant patient.”). Ultimately, in January of 2014, Mrs. Munoz’s family
was permitted to remove her from life support after a successful federal suit alleging that the
Texas statute was unconstitutional because it impinged on women’s right to make their own
decisions regarding medical treatment and because the statute violated the equal protection
clause by treating women differently from men. Judgment, Munoz v. John Peter Smith
Hospital, No. 096-270080-14, 96th Judicial District, Tarrant County, Texas (Jan. 24, 2014),
available at: http://thaddeuspope.com/images/MUNOZ_202053415-Judges-Order-on-MunozMatter.pdf. See also, Plaintiff’s First Amended Motion to Compel Defendants to Remove
Marlise Munoz From “Life Sustaining” Measures and Application For Unopposed Expedited
Relief; see also, Manny Fernandez, Suing to End Life Support for Woman and Fetus, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, A1.
220

See e.g., Lucinda J. Peach, From Spiritual Descriptions to Legal Prescriptions:
Religious Imagery of Woman as “Fetal Container,” 10 J. L. & RELIGION 73 (1993); Laura M.
Purdy, Are Pregnant Women Fetal Containers? 4 BIOETHICS 273 (1990); George J. Annas, At
Law: Pregnant Women as Fetal Containers, 16 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13 (Dec. 1986), Stable
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3562083. Last Accessed Aug.t 8, 2014.
In THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1985), Margaret Atwood creates a dystopian society in
which women are treated merely as both sex slaves and as fetal containers (and thereby offers
a critique of our own society). The protagonist, Offred (literally Of “Fred,” the name of her
owner) understands her objectification—she describes herself not as a concubine or as a slave,
but rather as a tool, a ‘two legged womb’—just something to be used. Id. at 136.
221

Peach, supra note 220, at 73.

222

Janice G. Raymond, Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving: The Altruistic Woman, in LIFE
CHOICES: A HASTINGS CENTER INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS 395, 399 (Joseph H. Howell &
William Frederick Sale eds., 2d ed. 2000).
223

See Marken, supra note 167, at 257 (explaining that once women are described as
deviant from social norms, they become subject to physician and judicial control).
224

See Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration, supra note 2.
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pregnant women risk punishment via the criminal law. Under this rhetoric, pregnant
women whose behaviors harm or potentially harm their fetuses are by definition
“bad mothers” – in need of punishment and control.
V. A PARADIGMATIC SHIFT? SHIFTING OUR FOCUS FROM SOCIAL CONTROL AND
RETRIBUTION TO SOCIAL JUSTICE
The fetal personhood and maternal deviance discourses that are the integral
background principles of fetal homicide statutes also have the purpose and effect of
enforcing the gender norms of motherhood. Feticide statutes, particularly those that
do not exclude behaviors by pregnant women that might cause fetal harm,
accomplish this by first treating the pregnant woman as a mother and next by
subjecting her to maternal norms.225 These statutes tell us that pregnant women are
expected to act not just as mothers, but as good mothers; and when they fail, the
maternal deviance discourse inherent in these statutes, justifies punishment. As
Tuerkheimer notes:
Although a pregnant woman is not yet a mother (unless she already has a
child), she is expected to possess the same characteristics that are
associated with idealized motherhood. The paradigmatic woman is
selfless, sacrificing, willing, and able to put the interests of her unborn
children ahead of her own needs and desires, and fully committed to- and
capable of- providing a uterine environment that is nothing short of
perfection. Deviation from this archetype threatens social norms; fetal
rights provide the justification from punishing any such deviation.226
The statutes further enforce gender norms by their focus on fetal harm (as
opposed to focusing on the harm done to the pregnant woman) and by making the
pregnant woman, and her interests, invisible.227 Once the acceptance of fetal rights is
established in this way, the rights of pregnant women become constricted by the
rights of the fetus and these women consequently become the target of state
intervention on behalf of the fetus.228
225

Id.

226

Tuerkheimer, supra note 165, at 692–93.

227

Tuerkheimer has also made similar observations with respect to the recognition of fetal
rights in feticide statutes and the enforcement of gender norms. She states:
Legal recognition of fetal rights can best be understood as a powerful mechanism for
enforcing societal notions of maternity and womanhood. . . . As the notion of fetal
personhood becomes ‘not merely acceptable’ but ‘increasingly . . . unchallengeable,’
fetal protective legislation may now be justified without reference to status-enforcing
norms, and even without reference to women.
Tuerkheimer, supra note 165, at 687–88 (quoting Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 261, 330 (1992)).
228

For example, at the time of this writing, non-consensual and court ordered obstetrical
interventions, detention and confinement of pregnant women, and the criminal prosecution of
pregnant women, including those whose behavior is self-harming is occurring all over the
country in the name of fetal rights. I am not just worried about some slippery slope. Nonconsensual and court ordered obstetrical interventions, detention and confinement of pregnant
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Fetal rights, fetal personhood, and maternal deviance are not the only ways to
think about pregnant women who engage in risky prenatal behavior. We can instead
attend to the issue of self-harming behaviors by pregnant women (and fetal harm) by
engaging in a public health model of problem solving. This mode of analysis and
problem solving allows us to focus on harm prevention and reduction strategies, and
social justice.229 Harm reduction and prevention strategies work to actually increase
the health of pregnant women, and as a result, their fetuses. Social justice is
important because it demands that we treat pregnant women as if their own lives
were meaningful, rather than treat pregnant women as means to effectuate other
social goals.
A. A Promising Shift of Focus: Using Public Health Law Principles to Address
Maternal and Fetal Harm
Despite the contemporary rhetoric of fetal personhood, maternal deviance, and
our penchant for punitive responses, several jurisdictions have instead opted for a
public health response to the self-harming and fetal-harming behavior of pregnant
women – specifically when that behavior involves maternal drug use.230 The
Guttmacher Institute reports that as many as twenty-five states have created or
funded additional treatment opportunities for pregnant women, or have given priority
access to pregnant women, in existing programs.231 A few jurisdictions have worked
to provide pregnant users with additional social services in order to ameliorate any
negative effects that drug and alcohol use might have on the developing fetus.232 The
women, and the criminal prosecution of pregnant women, including those whose behavior is
self-harming is occurring right now – all over the country – all in the name of fetal rights. For
accounts see JEANNE FLAVIN, OUR BODIES, OUR CRIMES: THE POLICING OF WOMEN’S
REPRODUCTION IN AMERICA (2009); Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration,
supra note 2; Cherry, Roe’s Legacy, supra note 3; Tuerkheimer, supra note 165, at 694 (“Once
fetuses are granted status as persons/children/victims, pregnant women become subject to
control by the full panoply of laws already in place to protect the rights of
persons/children/victims. Women who fail to conform to the maternal ideal typically, the most
marginalized members of society – have been the primary targets of state intervention on
behalf of the fetus.”).
229 The idea of “social justice” emanates from a broader theory of justice, and includes
access to the public goods necessary for achieving a “good” life. See, POWERS & FADEN, supra
note 12, at 16 (social justice includes concerns for well-being in the “six core dimensions:
health, personal security, reasoning, respect, attachment, and self-determination”); Amartya
Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in WORLD INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
RESEARCH (WIDER) OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY, CAPABILITY AND WELL-BEING 3031 (Martha C. Nussbaum et al. eds.) 1993 (“The functionings relevant for well-being vary
from such elementary ones as escaping morbidity and mortality, being adequately nourished,
having mobility, etc., to complex ones such as being happy, achieving self-respect, taking part
in the life of the community, [and] appearing in public without shame.”); NUSSBAUM, supra
note 12, at 41-42 (“All citizens should have these capabilities . . . life . . . bodily health and
integrity . . . bodily integrity . . . senses, imagination [and] thought . . . emotions . . . practical
reason . . . affiliation . . . [and] control over one’s environment, both political and material.”).
230

Dailard & Nash, supra note 79.

231

Id. at 5.

232

Id. (noting that Colorado, Kansas, and California have used this model).
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focus of these strategies is largely on the health and well-being of the fetus. The
health and well-being of the pregnant woman is secondary; simply instrumental to
the health of the fetus.233 Nevertheless, these public health models seem promising
for women. By making treatment or nutritional supplementation available, pregnant
women are given the opportunity to improve their own health and thereby increase
the possibilities and prospects for their own lives.
Legal scholars have begun to address these issues from a public health
approach.234 Here, too, the focus of the scholarship seems to be primarily on the
prevention of fetal harm rather than on the promotion of women’s health more
generally.235 While the recent work of public health law scholar Seema Mohapatra
challenges this focus, she nevertheless concludes that the ultimate public health
concern is fetal health. In her article Unshackling Addiction: A Public Health
Approach to Drug Use During Pregnancy, Mohapatra argues against the use of the
criminal law, and in favor of a public health law approach to the problems caused by
pregnant women who use drugs. 236 Mohapatra argues that:
[p]unishment alone does nothing to further the goal of reducing such drug
use. It also ignores the reality that women do not abuse drugs in a
vacuum. There are a variety of societal factors, such as poverty, domestic
violence, lack of social support and education, related to drug use.
Additionally, after a woman is already addicted to drugs, she may not just
will herself to stop even if she is pregnant. Women need access to
effective treatment options to properly overcome their addictions. Without
addressing these societal factors, a criminal model fails in helping the
woman or her baby. A public health model is broader in scope and
addresses these concerns.237
In the end, Mohapatra’s analysis suggests two things: that the criminal law may
not have a place in solving the problem of prenatal maternal drug use; and, that the
focus on prenatal maternal drug use is primarily to address the harm done to the
developing fetus.238
Mohapatra’s primary task is to outline the scope of public health methodologies
and to demonstrate how a public health approach would differ from the current use

233

Id.

234

See, e.g., Mohapatra, supra note 4; Linda C. Fentiman, supra note 4, at 269–70 (2011);
Flavin & Paltrow, supra note 4, 237–38 (2010).
235

Dailard, supra note 79.

236

Mohapatra, supra note 4.

237

Id. at 253; see also Peter Old & Jonathan Montgomery, Law, Coercion, and the Public
Health, 304 Brit. Med. J. 891 (1992).
238 Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 254. (“Additionally, the punitive approach is not grounded
in science. Legal drugs, such as tobacco and alcohol have been shown to have much greater
risk to the fetus than illegal drugs such as cocaine.”) (citing Deborah A. Frank, et al., Growth,
Development, and Behavior in Early Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure, 285 J.
AM. MED. ASS’ N 1613, 1621–24 (2001).
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of the criminal law.239 Specifically, she addresses how an application of the public
health objectives of harm prevention and harm reduction240 would change our
approach to pregnant women who are drug or alcohol dependent.241 While her
analysis has merit, I believe that an even greater shift is necessary. By focusing so
exclusively on potential harms to the fetus that result from the pregnant woman’s
behavior, we risk treating pregnant women merely as channels for fetal life. In other
words, I am suggesting that our focus – the public health focus – should be on the
health and welfare of the pregnant woman for her own sake rather than viewing her
instrumentally – that is, as a vehicle to ensure better fetal health.
The public health framework is especially attractive for thinking about issues
confronted by pregnant women because it is both pragmatic and consequentialist.242
Accordingly, public health frameworks demand the consideration of the socioeconomic conditions in which negative and potentially negative health behaviors
occur, and judges its success by determining whether the interventions actually
create better health outcomes.243 In other words, social and economic “stratification,
social networks and support, discrimination, work demands, and control” are focused
upon as a way to increase wellness and produce more positive outcomes among
populations, on the belief that “disease and other health outcomes . . . are affected by
the social world surrounding us all.”244
Using a public health policy framework, also demands consideration of the social
epidemiologist insight that social context (or “environments”) “place constraints on

239

Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 259–71 (discussing the need for a population-based and
evidence-based legal theory, the use of social epidemiology, and the public health values of
prevention of harm and harm reduction).
240

Harm prevention and the reduction of harm are two emphases of field of public health.
See GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 19–20 (2d ed. 2008) (focus of public health is prevention of
disease, but prevention and amelioration are not mutually exclusive).
241

Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 264–70.

242 As a philosophy, pragmatism attempts to assess the truth or meaning of an approach,
theory, or belief system, by through the success or failure of its practical application. See,
Raymond S. Pfeiffer, American Pragmatism: An Introduction to Classic American
Pragmatism, PHILOSOPHY NOW (July/Aug 2014) https://philosophynow.org/issues/43/
An_Introduction_to_Classic_American_Pragmatism. Consequentialist philosophy also looks
at the effect of an action or rule to determine its moral or ethical value. Robert M. Veatch, et
al., CASE STUDIES IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 1011 (2010); see also, James F. Childress et al.,
Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 169 (2002) (“public
health activities are generally understood to be teleological (end-oriented) and
consequentialist – the health of the public is the primary end that is sought and the primary
outcome for measuring success.”).
243 Social epidemiology is a branch of epidemiology which “studies the social distribution
and social determinants of states of health.” Lisa E. Beckman & Ichiro Kawachi, A Historical
Framework for Social Epidemiology, in SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 3-12, at 6 (Lisa E. Beckman
& Ichiro Kawachi, eds., 2000). As an important component of public health policy, social
epidemiology considers the ways in which social conditions or context influence health and
healthcare decision-making. See id. at 78.
244

Id. at 6.
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individual choice.”245 Considering context also facilitates social justice because it
allows us to more effectively respond to the needs of the community. As a
consequence, the public health model can shift attention away from blame and
punishment as a response to poor fetal outcomes among self-harming pregnant
women, and instead focus attention and efforts on transforming the context that
produces the self-harming (and fetal-harming) behavior among pregnant women.
The public health framework thus allows us to consider the values of harm
prevention and reduction as a pragmatic way to produce a more useful, and
compassionate response to pregnant women who engage in self-harming behaviors.
Similarly, it also allows us to consider social justice in our response, including a call
to treat pregnant women primarily as an end onto themselves rather than as conduits
for healthy fetuses.246
B. Harm Reduction and Prevention
Harm reduction and prevention are goal of both the criminal law247 and public
health policy.248 But for the criminal law, the reduction and prevention of harm are
not generally considered the primary mission. Rather, the primary purpose of the
criminal law is the punishment of the guilty—retribution or retaliation.249 Deterrence
or prevention of future harm, either by the subject herself, or by others, is a

245

Id. at 7–8; See also Childress, et al., supra note 242, at 169 (“social injustice expressed
in poverty, racism, and sexism have long been implicated in conditions of poor health.”).
246 Philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that human beings should be treated with dignity
and respect. By this he meant that human beings should not be treated as a means to another
individual’s ends, but rather as their own ends. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF M ORALS §§ 4:412, 4:440 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1998) [hereinafter
KANT, GROUNDWORK]; IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR T HE METAPHYSICS OF M ORALS:
ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE BECAUSE OF PHILANTHROPIC C ONCERNS § 436 (James W.
Ellington trans., 2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter KANT, ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE]. See also
JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 114-124 (1986); Adam Schulman,
Bioethics and the Question of Human Dignity, in HUMAN DIGNITY A ND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS
COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, 3, 6, 8, 10-11, 13 (2008)
available at https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_dignity
/human_dignity_and_bioethics.pdf; Jacob Dahl Rendtorff, Basic Ethical Principles in
European Bioethics and Biolaw: Autonomy, Dignity, Integrity, and Vulnerability – Towards a
Foundation of Bioethics and Biolaw, 5 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 235, 237 (2002)
(detailing the components of dignity).
247

JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 11 (1984)
(prevention of harm to third parties is a legitimate purpose of criminal legislation).
248

Lawrence O. Gostin, Mapping the Issues: Public Health, Law and Ethics, in PUBLIC
HEALTH LAW & ETHICS: A R EADER 1, 34 (Lawrence O. Gostin, 2ND ED., 2010).
249 Retribution is the oldest theory of criminal punishment and continues to have substantial
support in legal and lay communities. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in
the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 19 (2005) (retributive justice for punishment is
glorified in American Culture); But see, id. at 2223 (popularity of revenge as a motive for
criminal punishment); LAFAVE, supra note 28, at 2636 (detailing seven theories of
punishment).
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secondary consideration.250 In fact, many cases go so far as to assume deterrence is
achieved through punishment without any empirical proof in support.251 We see
these principles in action in the context of pregnant women whose behaviors harm
their fetuses. Laws regarding maternal behavior are increasingly punitive in nature,
culminating in fetal homicide laws that fail to protect pregnant women from
prosecution.252 At the same time, these punitive measures fail to prevent or reduce
fetal harm, the purpose for which they are, at least rhetorically, designed.253 The
number of fetuses and infants exposed to drugs is increasing despite the use of
criminal sanctions for drug use during pregnancy.254 Punishment and fear also can
cause harm to pregnant women and their fetuses because it discourages women from
accessing needed services.255 For example, women using drugs or alcohol sometimes
lie about their drug use or avoid prenatal medical care altogether for fear of legal
sanctions.256 Some women also forgo needed mental health or other medical
treatment for fear of criminal sanctions.257
The cases of Bei Bei Shuai, Rennie Gibbs, and Kawana Ashley also demonstrate
the criminal law’s difficulty in changing the behavior of pregnant women or

250 LAFAVE, supra note 28 (Prevention as a goal of criminal law is aimed at dissuading “the
criminal himself . . . from committing further crimes,” while deterrence is aimed at
discouraging others from committing future crimes).
251 This is indeed the situation with regard to punishment of pregnant women. Cherry, The
Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration, supra note 2. Although states have increasingly
punished pregnant women for damage done to their fetuses, there is no proof that suicidal
ideation, suicide attempts, or drug and alcohol use among pregnant women have decreased. Id.
Indeed, with respect to illicit drug use, some studies of pregnant women show that use has
been relatively stable. See, e.g., Behnke & Smith, supra note 47. Substance abuse treatment
admissions for pregnant women have also been stable. Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA), Trends in Substance Abuse among Pregnant Women
and Women of Childbearing Age in Treatment (July 25, 2013), http://www.samhsa.gov/
data/spotlight/spot110-trends-pregnant-women-2013.pdf (proportion of pregnant women
entering substance abuse treatment relatively stable between 2000 and 2010).
252

See supra, section II (discussion regarding fetal personhood or fetal homicide laws).

253

The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has recognized that even
though “legal action against women who abuse drugs prenatally is taken with the intent to
produce healthy birth outcomes, negative results are frequently cited.” Comm. on Health Care
for Underserved Women, Am. Col. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Committee Opinion
No. 473, Substance Abuse Reporting and Pregnancy: The Role of the ObstetricianGynecologists (2001; reaffirmed 2014). See also, Fentiman, supra note 4, at 239.
254

Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 264 (citing Fentiman, supra note 4, at 239).

255

Fentiman, supra note 4.

256

For example, Lester, et al., noted that women avoided prenatal care for fear that their
children would be removed for their care on account of their substance use. Lester et al., supra
note 4.
257

See, Sally Kohn, Indiana ‘Feticide’ Charge is the Latest Fallout from States’ Strict
Anti-bortion Laws, DAILY BEAST (August 27, 2014) http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2014/08/27/indiana-feticide-charge-is-the-latest-fallout-from-states-strict-anti-abortionlaws.html.
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protecting their fetuses from prenatal harm.258 These cases demonstrate that the
criminal law can only punish the outcome of the potentially deleterious behavior of
pregnant women. The criminal law has not been, or perhaps cannot be, effectively
used to combat the problem of fetal harm for two reasons. First, it does not take into
account the context in which the harm occurs. Understanding the context is crucial
for harm reduction and prevention, for misunderstood needs cannot be met. Second,
the criminal law presumes that the simple presence of criminal sanctions will prevent
or ameliorate harm. This has proven not to be the case.259 Ultimately, these
shortcomings in the criminal law signify that the criminal law cannot effectively
achieve the goals of harm reduction and prevention.
Conversely, a public health paradigm focuses primarily on the question of what
strategies will actually prevent the harm from occurring or reduce the potential for
harm. In order to make that assessment, public health policymakers cannot only look
at the resulting harm – the consequence of any behavior – they must likewise
consider the context (or social environments) in which the harm occurs. Looking at
the context is what permits the formulation of workable, practical, and pragmatic
solutions.
Mohapatra’s analysis makes this suggestion by looking at harm prevention
strategies for prenatal drug and alcohol exposure.260 When looking at the context in
which prenatal drug and alcohol exposure occurs, Mohapatra cites poverty, lack of
education, and the lack of mentoring programs that might offer social support to
women in need.261 She suggests early education and mentoring as a key component
of a public health prevention program, including drug and alcohol prevention
education, education about the criminal consequences of illicit drug use, and
mentoring programs for high-risk populations.262 Mohapatra notes that early
education (during middle and high school years) is essential because it gives young
women information regarding the effects of drug and alcohol use on the human fetus
before they get pregnant.263 Conversely, education provided during the prenatal
period is of little use for prevention as pregnant drug and alcohol users often do not
receive prenatal care, and harm to the fetus may have occurred before the woman
receives the information, and where pregnant women are drug or alcohol addicted,264
they may be unable to simply stop their use in light of the information.265 By
focusing on prevention education, “the hope is that fewer individuals begin to use

258

Supra section I.

259

See supra note 251.

260

Mohapatra, supra note 4.

261

Id. at 26465.

262

Id. at 265.

263

Id. at 266; see also Schroedel & Fiber, supra note 4 at 224; Lester et al., supra note 4.

264

Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 266.

265

McLellan, supra note 55, at 1689 (treatment entails the implementation of long-term
strategies of management and monitoring); Weber, supra note 55, at 638–39 (showing that a
majority of medical the community considers addiction a disease of the brain that requires
treatment for improvement of symptoms).

54

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 28:6

drugs and therefore, fewer need to face the criminal justice system.”266 Mohapatra’s
suggestions seem helpful because there is a close relationship between the proposals
and the harms she identifies – primarily harm to the fetus. But her suggestions do not
address harm prevention and reduction strategies directed toward harms to the
woman herself.
Similarly, with regard to harm reduction, in public health approaches, the focus is
principally on fetal health.267 For example, Mohapatra defines her “public health
approach to drug use during pregnancy . . . refers to reacting to the problem (drug
use) once it has occurred and trying to minimize the effects as much as possible.”268
Harm reduction for Mohapatra and others,269 is twofold. It consists of social support
and family friendly drug treatment programs for pregnant users instead of criminal
sanctions,270 and the “availability of appropriate and comprehensive drug
treatment.”271 Social supports include halting the removal of newborns and other
children on account of maternal drug and alcohol use absent other evidence of abuse
or neglect,272 and nutritional support for pregnant women.273 By discontinuing child
removal policies, the state can encourage pregnant women who use drugs or alcohol
to obtain prenatal treatment and to be more honest with their health care providers so
providers can offer appropriate care. Nutritional support as a harm reduction
measure should also be effective, as studies indicate that an improved nutrition status
of a pregnant woman improves the health status of the fetus.274 Finally, by making
appropriate and comprehensive treatment available, the state increases the chances
that the treatment will be effective.275 While all of these recommendations are
laudable, my concern is twofold. First I am concerned that at the core of these
266

Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 265.

267

Id.

268

Id. at 266; see also Steverson & Rieckman, supra note 61, at 317 (arguing that
availability of drug and alcohol treatment programs to pregnant and mothering women is
necessary in order to protect children from prenatal drug and alcohol exposure).
269

See, e.g., Dailard & Nash, supra note 79; Lester et al., supra note 4; Schroedel & Fiber,
supra note 4.
270 See Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 267 (citing David C. Brody & Heidee McMillian,
Combating Fetal Substance Abuse and Governmental Foolhardiness Through Collaborative
Linkages, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Common Sense: Helping Women Help Themselves,
12 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 243, 266 (2001).
271

Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 267.

272

See Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 267 (citing David C. Brody & Heidee McMillian,
Combating Fetal Substance Abuse and Governmental Foolhardiness Through Collaborative
Linages, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Common Sense: Helping Women Help Themselves,
12 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 243, 266 (2001); Lester et al., supra note 4.
273

See Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 26869.

274

Id. at 268.

275

For example, studies indicate that drug and alcohol treatment programs aimed at the
needs of women, particularly women-only programs, are more likely to be effective than
mixed-gender programs. National Abandoned Infants Assistance Resource Center, Fact Sheet:
Prenatal Substance Exposure 8-10 (March 2012) (Available at http://aia.berkeley.edu). See
also, Mohapatra, supra note 4, at 267; Steverson & Rieckman, supra note 61, at 316.
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suggestions is the belief that fetal harm reduction through drug treatment is possible
even though the scientific evidence on fetal harm is, in many cases, inconclusive.276
My second concern is that while all of the foregoing strategies are important in order
to decrease fetal harm, we should also be mindful that strategies need to, first and
foremost, reduce or prevent harm to the pregnant woman herself. Without such an
inquiry, we risk obscuring the importance of women as women, and risk treating
women without the dignity and respect they are owed as human beings because we
continue to treat pregnant women primarily as fetal containers.
C. Social Justice
Public health law and policy scholar Lawrence Gostin has written that “[t]he
prime objective of public health law is to pursue the highest level of physical and
mental health in the population, consistent with the values of social justice.”277 As
such, the value of social justice – directing our attention to the deprivations of the
most disadvantaged in society – is a critical element of a public health analysis and
has been described as one of the core values of public health law and policy.278
Social justice is important in the context of public health, because without this value,
the needs of the most vulnerable would be neglected, resulting in the destruction of
public trust and social cohesion. Gostin argues:
Neglecting the needs of the vulnerable predictably harms the whole
community by eroding public trust and undermining social cohesion. It
signals to those affected and to everyone else that the basic human needs
of some matter less than those of others, and thereby it fails to show the
respect due to all members of the community. Social justice thus not only
encompasses a core commitment to fair distribution of resources, but also
calls for policies of action that are consistent with the preservation of
human dignity and showing of equal respect for the interests of all
members of the community.279
Accordingly, the social justice mission of public health is not solely for the
benefit of the disadvantaged; rather, it benefits the entire community. Moreover,
social justice is not solely a consideration of how social groups are treated, it also
entails a consideration of how individuals (as members of social groups) are treated.
Thus, social justice requires that individuals as well as social groups be treated with
dignity and respect.280 As a consequence, social justice in the public health context
requires us both “to engage in systematic action to ensure the conditions for
improved health for all members of the populations,” and to “identify[] and
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See discussion supra pp.1112.
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GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 4.

278

Id. at 2122.

279

Id. at 23.

280 See Marc J. Roberts & Michael R. Reich, Ethical Analysis in Public Health, 359
LANCET 1055, 1056 (2002); Childress et al., supra note 242, at 170.
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ameliorat[e] patterns of systematic disadvantage that profoundly and pervasively
undermine the prospects for well-being of oppressed and subordinated groups.”281
1.

Access to Resources

Social justice in the context of public health requires that policymakers look at
the context, or environment in which harm occurs.282 Context allows policymakers to
determine which populations are subject to systemic hardships and what response
would work to ameliorate these hardships. Amelioration often involves the resources
of state actors.283 Thus, social justice also requires an active state – one that has a
duty to ensure the access to the resources needed for good health for the right to
good health is meaningless without access to sufficient resources.284 Access to
281 GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 22. Gostin argues that in the context of public health, social
justice is a form of distributive justice – requiring the state “to act to limit the extent to which
the burden of disease falls unfairly upon the least advantaged and to ensure that the burden of
the interventions themselves is distributed equitably. Distributive justice also requires fair
allocation of public health benefits.”). Id.
282 In this way social justice may be congruent with the aims and approach of “reproductive
justice.” Reproductive justice as an ethic and as a movement, developed by women of color
involved in social justice and women’s health care movements. It is designed to look at the
social context in which reproductive health is created and maintained. See REPRODUCTIVE
JUSTICE BRIEFING BOOK: A PRIMER ON REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (available
athttp://protectchoice.org/downloads/Reproductive%20Justice%20Briefing%20Book.pdf); see
also Kimala Price, What Is Reproductive Justice? How Women of Color Activists Are
Redefining the Pro-Choice Paradigm, 10 MERIDIANS, 42 (2010) (describing the history and
content of the reproductive justice movement); Sarah London, Reproductive Justice:
Developing a Lawyering Model, 13 BERKELEY J. AFRICAN-AMERICAN L. & POL’Y 71 (2011)
(describing the history and content of the reproductive justice movement as well as lawyering
strategies); Zakiya Luna & Kristen Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
327 (2013) (highlighting the intertwining histories of the reproductive health, reproductive
rights, and reproductive justice movements, and the relationships between scholarship and
activism in these areas); Zakiya Luna, From Rights to Justice: Women of Color Changing the
Face of US Reproductive Rights Organizing, 4 SOCIETIES WITHOUT BORDERS 343 (2009)
(reproductive justice integrates a human rights analysis into domestic reproductive rights law
and policy).
283 Loretta Ross, What is Reproductive Justice?, in REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE BRIEFING BOOK:
A PRIMER ON REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 4, 4 (available at
http://protectchoice.org/downloads/Reproductive%20Justice%20Briefing%20Book.pdf).
284 Roberts & Reich, Ethical Analysis in Public Health, supra note 280, at 105657.
Roberts and Reich note that public health includes a more political or civic component as
well. They note “that a minimum level of health is necessary for people to have a reasonable
range of opportunity when they make life choices. In this view, health is a component of each
citizen’s opportunity – like such basic liberties as free speech and political participation.”). Id.
at 1057. Loretta Ross, one of the reproductive justice movement’s founders argues that
reproductive justice also requires positive state action on behalf of those with the fewest
choices and opportunities. She notes that at its core, the reproductive justice framework:

addresses the social reality of inequality, specifically, the inequality of opportunities
that we have to control our reproductive destiny. Moving beyond a demand for
privacy and respect for individual decision making to include the social supports
necessary for our individual decisions to be optimally realized, this framework also
includes obligations from our government for protecting women’s human rights.
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resources requires that we look at the context in which the harm occurs (i.e. poverty,
racism, systemic deprivation) in order to determine what resources are necessary to
improve conditions and abate the harm. Pregnant women who are depressed and
suicidal, who are addicted to drugs and alcohol, and those who lack the resources to
procure a legal abortion, like Ms. Shuai, Ms. Gibbs, and Ms. Ashley, are among the
most vulnerable in American society. Not only are they female, and hence subject to
a culture that devalues them as women and demonizes them as bad mothers,285 but
they also are often poor and undereducated, and as a result, have few social
resources available to them.286 When we consider the context in which the harms
arise, it is evident that these women are part of a population that is subject to
multiple patterns of systematic disadvantage, and that their health might be
considerably improved if they had access to additional public resources.
As noted previously, in their assessments of public health strategies for pregnant
women who are drug or alcohol addicted, many scholars have suggested that early
drug and alcohol education, access to drug and alcohol treatment, and nutritional
supplementation are approaches that could potentially enhance fetal outcomes.287
Each of these approaches also provides access to resources for women to improve
their own health. Similar resources can be brought to bear for women who are
depressed and suicidal. Like alcohol and drug abuse, depression is a chronic illness
that benefits from medical treatment. Making psychological and medical treatment
more available to pregnant women would help in improving the health and wellbeing of pregnant women (and in turn, their fetuses). Finally, better access to
contraception and abortion resources for all women as a positive right, regardless of
socio-economic status and age,288 would help to stem the problems of self-induced
Loretta Ross, What is Reproductive Justice? in REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE BRIEFING BOOK: A
PRIMER ON REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 4, 4 (available at
http://protectchoice.org/downloads/Reproductive%20Justice%20Briefing%20Book.pdf).
285

See discussion supra section II.

286 See, Rebecca Joyce Kissane, et al., Social Ties, Social Support, and Collective Efficacy
among Families from Public Housing in Chicago and Baltimore, J. OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOC.
WELFARE 157, 159 (2012) (“neighborhood disadvantage results in individual disadvantage, as
residents of high-poverty neighborhoods are socially isolated from the mainstream world of
educational and job opportunities”).
287

See discussion supra p. 62.

288

Under current privacy jurisprudence, the rights to contraception and abortion are
construed as negative rights, thus solely limiting state interference. As Robin West notes:
The constitutional preference for negative over positive liberty is captured by the oftmade claim that the Constitution itself is a negative one. The Constitution, it is said,
protects our negative rights to be free from intrusion instead of our positive rights to a
positively free, active, involved, civic, or healthy existence. The Constitution at least
according to its modern interpreters, is a shield of protection; it is not a sword of
entitlement.
Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REV. 441, 448 (1992).
A positive right would require state intervention in order to ensure access to these
services. Recent developments in the law, including The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 (often referred to as the “Affordable Care Act” or “Obamacare”), with its
contraceptive mandate, moves toward viewing access to family planning services as a positive
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abortion and illegal abortion, both of which endanger the lives of women.289 This
would entail substantive legislation, such as overturning the Hyde Amendment290 –
so as to permit the use of federal funds for abortions for poor women who want
them; and enacting legislation to ensure access to contraception to all women of
childbearing age, possibly through Medicaid, Title X programs,291 and private
insurance.
In order to safeguard social justice for women who engage in behaviors while
pregnant that may pose risks to their fetuses, we need to consider what resources
these women need to ensure better health outcomes for themselves. Safeguarding the
health of women necessarily results in safeguarding the health of fetuses. By putting
the health needs of women first, fetuses will also benefit. However, this is not the
end of the social justice inquiry because social justice also requires treating both
individuals and communities with dignity and respect.
2. Dignity and Social Justice
The social justice potential of public health policy is that, at the end of the day,
the dignity of the community and the individual will be respected and indeed,
promoted. To approach the social justice aspect of public health policy,
policymakers must determine what populations are most vulnerable in society and at
the greatest risk for poor health. They must also evaluate how those vulnerabilities
can be reduced or prevented, and how to do so in a fair and respectful manner. 292 If
right. Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010); see also Press Release, Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. (Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.
html (explaining contraception mandate).
289

See text supra at p. 23.

290

Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the "Hyde Amendment."
These amendments to the Social Security Act prohibited the use of federal funds for the
reimbursement of the costs of non-medically necessary abortions and strictly limit the use of
federal funds for the reimbursement of the costs of medically necessary abortions under the
Medicaid program. Pub.L. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, note 2 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466 (1977).
291

Title X of the Social Security Act includes funding for family planning. The purpose of
Title X is to ensure “access to a broad range of family planning and related preventive health
services for millions of low-income or uninsured individuals and others” through low cost
family planning clinics. Title X Family Planning, http://www.hhs.gov/opa/title-x-familyplanning/.
292 See GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 11; Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New
Century: Part I: Law as a Tool to Advance the Community’s Health, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
2837, 2840 (2000). There may sometimes be a conflict between the state’s duty to prevent
harm and the individual’s right to autonomy and liberty. In those cases, Gostin suggests that
public health law requires that certain questions be asked:

Does the coercive intervention truly reduce aggregate health risks, and what, if any,
less intrusive interventions might reduce those risks as well or better? Respect for the
rights of individuals and fairness toward groups of all races, religions, and cultures
remain at the heart of public interest law.
GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 12.

2015]

FROM RETRIBUTION TO SOCIAL JUSTICE

59

social justice means anything, it means that the dignity of the individual and of
communities are to be respected. In the context of public health, dignity and respect
is Kantian.293 This means that individuals and groups are to be treated as an end in
themselves and not as a means to the ends of others.294 Dignity means that
individual autonomy is respected,295 and modern notions of autonomy require
“freedom from coercion, manipulation, and temporary distortion of judgment,” and
the availability of “an adequate set of options.”296
In the public health realm, this value is often expressed in the pragmatic
preference of permitting access to health care measures on a voluntary basis, rather
than enforcing health through the coercive action of the state.297 As British public
health scholars Peter Old and Jonathan Montgomery argue, “enforcing social
responsibility through the threat of punishment is . . . probably counterproductive. It
alienates those with disease and discourages them from seeking medical help.
Effective disease control must depend primarily on working with those who are
infected, not characterising them as the enemy.”298
Consequently, in the instant case, the value of dignity should be articulated by
voluntariness, offering assistance and access to resources on a non-compulsory basis,
not through the coercion of the criminal law. Dignity also requires that we treat
pregnant women as individuals first, instead of defaulting to concerns about fetal
293 See, KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 246; KANT, ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE, supra
note 246.
294

Roberts & Reich, supra note 306, at 1056; RACHELS, supra note 246, at11424.

295 Autonomy, which includes notions of choice, which I define here as the right to assert
one’s own interest without abuse and exploitation from others. Choice, defined in this manner,
is central to dignity and respect. See Old & Montgomery, supra note 237, at 892 (underlying
assumption in public health law is that “individuals are best placed to judge their own
interests.”).

Under these liberal conceptions of autonomy, found in public health, bioethics, and
liberalism scholarship, autonomy is “self-defining, self-interested, and self-protecting,” and
any interference in an individual’s autonomy must be justified, if it can be justified, by
extreme circumstances. SUSAN SHERWIN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S HEALTH: EXPLORING
AGENCY AND AUTONOMY 34, 22 (1998) (autonomy is “a fundamental moral precept for health
care.”). The right to refuse medical treatment is a right based on the notion that the autonomy
of an individual, including to make decisions that might harm him, can be outweighed only by
four countervailing state interests: (1) the preservation of life, (2) the prevention of suicide, (3)
the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and (4) the protection of innocent third parties.
See, e.g., In re Fetus of Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ill. 1997).
296 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 877 (1994)
(citations omitted); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 37377 (1986).
297

GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 113 (Although the state has the power to coerce behavior in
the name of public health (to protect the community interest in health), the state’s power to
coerce is limited by the individual’s right to autonomy, liberty, and other constitutionally
protected rights and interests. See Gostin, supra note 292, at 2840. Gostin also argues that
coercion is constitutionally permissible only where five conditions are met: public health
necessity, reasonable means, proportionality, harm avoidance, and fairness. GOSTIN, supra
note 12, at 12628.
298

Old & Montgomery, supra note 237, at 891.
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welfare. If we rely too heavily on fetal welfare concerns, we risk treating pregnant
women solely as a means to fetal health and, thus not with dignity.
VI. CONCLUSION
I began this essay by setting forth examples of women who are depressed,
suicidal, drug addicted and simply desperate, and who consequently engaged in
behavior that caused harm to their fetuses. These examples are illustrative of the fact
that pregnant women who engage in behaviors that harm their fetuses are not
animated by malice. Rather, these behaviors are the result of illness, desperation, the
lack of social safety nets, health care, and economic resources. Many argue in favor
of imposing criminal law sanctions in these cases. The substance of their argument
is that the fetus has an interest that must be vindicated by the criminal law. Beneath
this principle, hegemonic notions of women in general, pregnant women, and
women of color in particular, motivate the arguments. Hegemonic motherhood is
white, middle class, and requires altruism. Women who are sanctioned for prenatal
behavior that harms their fetuses are often non-white,299 poor,300 and through their
self-harming behaviors (suicidal, drug using, desperate) are not acting in an altruistic
manner. In short, they are seen as “bad mothers” and are, therefore properly subject
to sanctions by the community, including criminal punishment.
Others argue that where prenatal maternal behavior has harmed the fetus,
criminal sanctions are inappropriate and counterproductive. These scholars suggest
that the problem should not be individualized, as it is in the criminal law, but should
instead be viewed through a public health lens. Public health frameworks are useful
for many reasons, including the ability to consider the social environment that
produces the health problem. Additionally, they are pragmatic in that they look for a
solution to the problem in terms of harm prevention and reduction. These
frameworks are useful because they look to achieve justice for both individuals and
communities. In the case of prenatal maternal behavior, a public health approach
allows a solution to be fashioned that takes into account pregnant women’s social
location and the effects of poverty, discrimination, violence, need, and despair. The
public health framework, as it has been envisioned, turns away from a retributive
solution, instead focusing on preventing and abating fetal harm.
Finally, the public health framework tries to ensure some measure of social
justice. Social justice is difficult to achieve where there are social factors outside of
the pregnant woman’s control for which she is held responsible. By looking at the
social environment, the public health framework allows us to reduce our emphasis
on individual personal responsibility, and focus more appropriately on changing the
conditions in which the harm occurs.
While there is much to commend in a public health approach, I have nevertheless
argued that scholars suggesting it have mistakenly focused on the wrong actor. In
this essay I have argued that the focus of the public health inquiry should be on the
woman, not the fetus. The proper vantage point from which to view the problem of
prenatal fetal harm is actually the harm experienced by the pregnant woman, rather
than any injury experienced by the fetus. In essence, I am arguing that any fetal harm
299 See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 36, at 311 (finding that 52% of arrests and
interventions were of Black women; 41% of the women were white).
300 See id. (finding that 71% of pregnant women subject to forced intervention or arrest
were represented by indigent defense counsel).
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that has occurred has only occurred because the pregnant woman has herself been
harmed, even when the harm has been self-inflicted. As a result, it is only by
focusing on the social needs of women that fetuses such as the ones mentioned in the
aforementioned cases will have a better chance of good health.
Moreover, securing the social justice promise of public health is only possible if
the pregnant woman and her interests are primary. When we give the fetus a legally
cognizable interest and make those interests primary, we do a grave injustice to the
dignity of the pregnant woman. Fetal rights rhetoric in this context does not help
prevent harm to the fetus. All the rhetoric does is make the pregnant woman’s pain
invisible. It tells us that women are primarily incubators for the fetus and that
women are merely instrumental in fetal health. My hope is that using a public health
framework will lead to an approach that prevents women from being objectified in
this manner, while recognizing their dignity, and giving them the social resources
they need to lead healthier lives.

